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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF
1996: WHEN LEGISLATIVE REGULATION BECOMES UNCONSTITU
TIONAL PUNISHMENT
INTRODUCTION
In 1974, the United States Department of Justice brought a
landmark antitrust suit against the American Telephone & Tele
graph Company ("AT&T").1 It alleged that AT&T, or the Bell Sys
tem, participated in a conspiracy to use its local service monopolies
to disadvantage competitors in the long distance service and tele
communications equipment markets.2 Eventually the case was set
tled under terms that came to be known as the AT&T Consent
Decree or Modified Final Judgment ("Consent Decree"). 3 The
Consent Decree did not constitute evidence or an admission of the
antitrust violations; however, it required AT&T to divest itself of
twenty-two subsidiaries known as the Bell Operating Companies
("BOCs").4 The BOCs were then grouped into seven regional Bell
Operating Companies ("RBOCS").5 While the BOCs maintained
1. See United States v. AT&T, 461 F. Supp. 1314,1317-18 (D.D.C. 1978) (alleging
violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, by AT&T, Western Electric Co.,
and Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc.); see also United States v. AT&T, 427 F. Supp.
57,58 (D.D.C. 1976) (noting that Western Electric Co. was a wholly owned subsidiary
of AT&T and that Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc. was jointly owned by AT&T and
Western Electric); United States v. AT&T, No. 74-1698, 1976 WL 1321, at *1 (D.D.C.
Oct. 1, 1976) (alleging that AT&T conspired with an additional twenty-three named
telephone companies, of which AT&T owned some or all of the voting shares).
2. See AT&T, 461 F. Supp. at 1317-18 (including allegations of denying access to
local monopolies, making unlawful rate adjustments, and refusing to allow competitors'
telephone customers to use their own terminal equipment or connect to the AT&T
network).
3. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131,222-34 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub
nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). Although commonly referred to
as a "modified" decree, in actuality the court vacated a 1956 decree that resulted from a
1949 antitrust suit brought against AT&T. See id. at 143. For a discussion of the proce
dural history of the 1949 action see id. at 135-39. The government brought the 1974 suit
in part because of the inadequacies of the 1956 decree in preventing AT&T from creat
ing barriers to free competition. See id. at 139 n.18. The "modification" allowed the
court to issue orders of compliance, modify or construe the decree, and punish viola
tions of the decree. See id. at 143.
4. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 143. The BOCs are companies that operate facili
ties that allow customers to complete local calls and obtain access to long distance and
international networks. See id. at 139 n.19.
5. See id. at 142 n.41.
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their ability to operate in local service markets, they were prohib
ited from operating in the long-distance service6 and telecommuni
cations equipment markets?
The Consent Decree soon became too controversial for the dis
trict court to enforce. 8 In part to address the AT&T problem, Con
gress enacted the Telecommunications Act9 in 1996 to establish a
statutory scheme whereby the BOCs' entry into lines of business
would be regulated by the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC"). However, a new controversy has arisen. Although the
Act rescinded the Consent Decree,lO it also contained a section en
titled "Special Provisions Concerning Bell Operating Companies,"
which placed limits on the BOCs ability to enter the long-distance
market.!1 In 1997, SBC Communications, Inc., an RBOC, filed suit
against the United States and the FCC alleging that the Special Pro
visions were invalid as an unconstitutional bill of attainder.12 An
other RBOC made the same claim in the District of Columbia.13
Both circuit courts held that the Special Provisions section of
6. See SHC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226, 230 n.3 (5th Cir. 1998);
see also AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 227. The HOCs were permitted to operate within a
geographically defined "local access and transport area" or "LATA." However, when a
long distance call was made, the HOC was required to direct the call to an inter
exchange carrier which carried the calls between LATAs or "interLATA." See SBC
Communications, Inc., 154 F.3d at 230 n.3.
7. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 224. The BOCs were prohibited from manufactur
ing or marketing telecommunications products or customer premises equipment, as well
as providing directory advertising services and information services. See id. at 143.
8. See SBC Communications, Inc., 154 F.3d at 231 n.5 (noting that District Court
Judge Harold H. Greene, who handled and monitored the AT&T matter, was often
referred to by journalists and other critics as the "telecommunication's czar" because of
his potential influence and power over the industry). See infra note 182 and accompa
nying text for a discussion of the controversy.
9. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § l(a), 110 Stat. 56
(codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.c.). See infra Parts II.A and II.B for a discus
sion of the Telecommunications Act, its history and its effects.
10. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 601(a)(1), 110 Stat.
143; see also United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1996 WL 255904 (D.D.C. Apr. 11,
1996) (terminating the Consent Decree, as of the date the Telecommunication Act was
signed into law, February 8, 1996).
11. See 47 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (providing that "[n]either a
Bell operating company, nor any affiliate of a Bell operating company, may provide
interLATA services except as provided in this section"); see also id. § 271(c) (requiring
the BOC to meet specified requirements); id. § 271(d) (providing procedures whereby a
BOC may apply for authorization to provide such services). See infra Part II.B for a
discussion of the Telecommunications Act and its effects.
12. See SBC Communications, Inc., 154 F.3d at 233. See infra Part II.A for a
definition of bill of attainder.
13. See BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58, 60 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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the Telecommunications Act was not unconstitutional as a bill of
attainder. This Note examines these findings and considers
whether they are consistent with the bill of attainder prohibition in
the United States Constitution. Part I of this Note examines the
history of the attainder prohibition and its role in the separation of
powers between the judicial and legislative branches of government
and discusses the meaning and scope of the Bill of Attainder Clause
as interpreted by Supreme Court decisions. Next, Part II outlines
the history and purpose of the Special Provisions section of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the requirements it imposes
on the BOCs. Part III examines the Fifth and District of Columbia
Circuit Courts' application of the Bill of Attainder Clause to the
Special Provisions. Finally, Part IV evaluates the Telecommunica
tions Act's Special Provisions section and concludes that it is uncon
stitutional as a bill of attainder because it constitutes legislation that
operates with specificity and inflicts punishment on the BOCs.
I.

A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

What is a Bill of Attainder?

A bill of attainder is "a law that legislatively determines guilt
and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable individual without pro
vision of the protections of a judicial trial."14 In light of the bill of
attainder's infamous tradition, the framers of the Constitution were
determined to include a prohibition against bills of attainder en
acted by either Congress I5 or the states. 16
The British Parliament first enacted bills of attainder in the
fourteenth centuryP The initial purpose of the bills was to ensure
that the estates of dead traitors would escheat to the Crown. IS The
14. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977). See, e.g.,
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 445 (1965); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303,
315-16 (1946); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1867); Ex parte Gar
land, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 377 (1866).
15. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (stating that "[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex post
facto Law shall be passed"). The presence of the prohibitions against bills of attainder
and ex post facto laws in the same constitutional provision has been explained by the
fact that legislative punishment of an individual (a bill of attainder) was often imposed
retroactively (ex post facto). See ZECHARIA CHAFEE, JR., THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, 92-93 (1956).
16. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (stating that "[n]o State shall ... pass any
Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law").
17. See Note, Bills ofAttainder and the Supreme Court in J960--Flernming v. Nes
tor, 1961 WASH. u. L.Q. 402, 403.
18. See Michael P. Lehmann, The Bill of Attainder Doctrine: A Survey of the De
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person to whom the bill of attainder applied was deemed attainted
with "the corruption of blood."19 This meant that the person could
not inherit or transfer his wealth to his descendants.2o The "convic
tion" was legislatively determined and could occur regardless of
whether the condemned behavior was previously prohibited by
law. 21
Bills of attainder were usually enacted "in times of rebellion,
or gross subserviency to the [C]rown, or of violent political excite
ments."22 However, bills of attainder were not reserved for those
perceived as traitors or threats to the Crown, but were often gener
ally applied to other categories of individuals such as the poor. 23
Indeed, while some bills of attainder singled out named individuals
for punishment, other bills punished many individuals by designat
ing a broad range of characteristics that applied to those
individuals. 24
While the bills usually imposed capital punishment, sometimes
the punishment was less than death and the bill was called a bill of
pains and penalties. 25 Punishment under a bill of pains and penal
ties could include banishment, deprivation of an avocation or office,
or disfranchisement.26
Although the Constitutional Convention ultimately denounced
the use of bills of attainder, American bills of attainder were com
monplace before 1787 as a means of eliminating the presence of
Tories in the colonies.27 The bills, not unlike their English prede
cisional Law,S HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 767, 772 (1978) (citing CHAFEE, supra note 15,
at 102).
19. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 381.
20. Cf Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 327 (1867) (holding that a
deprivation of the right to practice an avocation constitutes punishment in the Bill of
Attainder context in accordance with the history of bills of attainder in England).
21. See id.
22. Id. at 323 (quoting Justice Story).
23. See Ex parte Law, 15 F. Cas. 3, 10 (D.C.S.D. Ga. 1866) (No. 8126) (citing an
English bill of attainder that disfranchised all voters who fell below a certain yearly
rental income).
24. See Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 323-24 (referring to an English bill against
the Earl of Kildare and others, which stated that" 'all such persons which be or hereto
fore have been comforters, abettors, partakers, confederates, or adherents unto the said
late earl ... in his or their false and traitorous acts and purposes, shall in likewise stand,
and be attainted, adjudged, and convicted of high treason"') (citation omitted).
25. See Ex parte Law, 15 F. Cas. at 9-10.
26. See id. Disfranchisement is "the taking away of the elective franchise (that is,
the right of voting in public elections) from any citizen or class of citizens." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 468 (6th. ed. 1990).
27. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965); see also Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 634 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Americans who favored the
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cessors, banished British sympathizers as traitors, confiscated their
property, and disqualified them from political offices and other pro
fessions. 28 The framers of the U.S. Constitution ultimately sought
to end this practice of legislative punishment.

B.

The Separation of Powers Doctrine

Given the history of bills of attainder in England and in the
colonies under the Articles of Confederation, the framers of the
U.S. Constitution sought to ensure that the bill of attainder device
would not be abused by the legislative branches of the federal or
state governments of the United States.29 Alexander Hamilton and
James Madison were among those who advocated for a provision in
the Constitution banning bills of attainder. 30 Madison wrote that
bills of attainder:
are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to
every principle of sound legislation. . .. Our own experience has
taught us ... that additional fences against these dangers ought
not to be omitted. Very properly therefore have [sic] the Con
vention added this constitutional bulwark in favor of personal se
curity and private rights ....31

Hamilton shared a similar sentiment:
[N]othing is more common than for a free people, in times of
heat and violence, to gratify momentary passions, by letting into
the government principles and precedents which afterwards
prove fatal to themselves. Of this kind is the doctrine of disquali
fication, disfranchisement, and banishment by acts of the legisla
ture. . .. If the legislature can disfranchise any number of citizens
at pleasure by general descriptions, ... [t]he name of liberty ap
plied to such a government, would be a mockery of common
British side in the American Revolutionary War were known as Tories. WEBSTER'S
2414 (1993).
28. See Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 735 (1951) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); see also James Westfall Thompson, Anti-Loyalist Legislation During the
American Revolution, 3 ILL. L. REv. 81, 147 (1908). See, e.g., Brown, 381 U.S. at 442
n.15.
29. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 318 (1946) ("[O]ur ancestors had
ample reason to know that legislative trials and punishments were too dangerous to
liberty to exist in the nation of free men they envisioned. And so they proscribed bills
of attainder.").
30. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison), Nos. 78, 84 (Alexan
der Hamilton).
31. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 227 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
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sense. 32
Referring to the bill of attainder, Hamilton declared that the power
to punish must be kept separate from the legislature. 33 Otherwise,
unchecked power could present the considerable danger that "all
the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to
nothing" and there would be "no liberty."34 Hamilton further ex
plained that it is the province of the courts to invalidate bills of
attainder when they are created because "limitations of this kind
can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium
of courts of justice; whose duty it must be to declare all acts con
trary to the manifest tenor of the constitution void. "35
As early as 1810, the Supreme Court addressed the importance
of the separation of powers issue involved in the Bill of Attainder
Clause in Fletcher v. Peck. 36 The Court found that not only did the
framers intend to guard against "sudden and strong passions" that
could influence the legislature to deprive individuals of property,
but the restrictions placed on that power, including the Bill of At
tainder Clause, were "founded in [that] sentiment."37 The Court
reasoned that "[i]t is the peculiar province of the legislature to pre
scribe general rules for the government of society; the application
of those rules to individuals in society would seem to be the duty of
other departments."38 Consequently, the Supreme Court has ex
amined the constitutionality of legislation that has been alleged to
single out individuals or groups for punishment under the Bill of
Attainder Clause.
C.

Supreme Court Interpretation

The United States Supreme Court has had few opportunities to
interpret the Bill of Attainder Clause and thus draw the line be
tween permissible legislation and legislative punishment. However,
32. JOHN C. HAMILTON, HISTORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 34
(1859).
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 394 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed.,
1982).
34. Id.
35. Id.; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803) (holding
that it is the province of the judiciary to declare void legislative acts that are contrary to
the Constitution).
36. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); see also Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)
213, 286 (1827) (noting that the general intent of the Bill of Attainder Clause was to be
"a general provision against arbitrary and tyrannical legislation over existing rights").
37. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 138.
38. Id. at 136.

REGULATION OR UNCONSTITUTIONAL PUNISHMENT

2000]

277

the Court has established a two-part test which must be satisfied for
legislation to constitute a proscribed bill of attainder. First, the act
must operate with specificity.39 Second, the act must inflict punish
ment without the benefit of a judicial proceeding.40
1.

Specificity

In England, it was not necessary for a bill of attainder to specif
ically refer to an individual for that individual to be attainted.
Often the bills referred to one person by name and any other per
son who acted similarly, such as in rebellion against the Crown.41
As a result, bills of attainder generally were directed at individuals,
but could target whole classes of individuals. 42
In the United States, however, the Bill of Attainder Clause has
been invoked when "specifically designated persons or groups"43
have been punished by a legislative act.44 The Bill of Attainder
Clause thus protects those individuals or private groups that would
otherwise be "vulnerable to nonjudicial determinations of guilt. "45
Acts that have narrowly targeted named individuals46 or have af
fected a broad group, such as ex-Confederates,47 are examples of
acts that the Supreme Court has identified as acts that target indi
viduals or groups and meet the specificity requirements. Still, the
specificity requirement remains to be defined in some areas, such as
39. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 321-23 (1946); SBC Communica
tions, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226, 233 (5th Cir. 1998).
40. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977).
41. See Ex ~rte Law, 15 F. Cas. 3, 8-9 (D.CS.D. Ga. 1866) (No. 8126) (citing
English bills of attainder). See supra notes 18, 20, 22 and accompanying text for discus
sion of the English origins of the bill of attainder.
42. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1867); see also supra
note 24 discussing bills directed at an individual.
43. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,447 (1965).
44. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 513 (1989) (Ste
vens, J., concurring) (private citizens); Lovett, 328 U.S. at 315 (individuals); Cummings,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 324 (individuals or a class of individuals).
45. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,324 (1966) (holding that a state
cannot raise a Bill of Attainder claim for its citizens because the Clause only applies to
citizens, and a state is not the parens patriae of its citizens).
46. See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 315 (finding that an appropriations bill that named
three government employees, including Lovett and two others, for subversive activities
and withdrew their salaries met the specificity requirement).
47. See Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 322. The Court found that an act that
targeted anyone "who has ever been in armed hostility to the United States ... or to the
government of this State; or has ever given aid, comfort, countenance, or support to
persons engaged in any such hostility; or has ever ... adhered to the enemies, foreign or
domestic" was specific. See id. at 279 (emphasis omitted).
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where a legislative act singles out a corporation for punishment.48
The mere fact that an individual or group has been defined in a
legislative act does not mean that the Bill of Attainder Clause is
implicated. 49 Congress may legislate regarding any person or group
who commits certain acts or possesses certain general characteris
tics so long as it sets forth generally applicable rules and leaves to
the courts the role of deciding who has committed those acts or
possesses those characteristics. 50 On the other hand, when the leg
islature specifically designates an individual or group and punishes
that individual or group, the law will be struck down. For example,
in United States v. Brown,5! the Supreme Court invalidated a law
that forbade members of the Communist Party from holding posi
tions as officers in labor unions as a means of limiting political
strikes. 52 Because the statute "designate[d] in no uncertain terms
the persons who possess[ed] the feared characteristic[] . . . [i.e.]
members of the Communist Party,"53 the statute met the specificity
requirement of the Bill of Attainder Clause. By contrast, the
Supreme Court dealt with another statute targeting the Communist
Party a few years earlier, but found it to be constitutional since the
act described the Communist Party by its activities without specifi
cally naming it. 54
In addition to evaluating the terms of a statute to determine
whether an act operates with sufficient generality to avoid a chal
lenge under the Bill of Attainder Clause, the Court has also consid
ered whether the effect of an act can be avoided by the individual
or group that it designates. For example, in Communist Party ofthe
United States v. Subversive Activities Control Boarxi,55 the Court
found that the statute in question operated with insufficient speci
ficity to constitute a bill of attainder because it was entirely possible
for an individual to avoid falling within the statute's broad defini
48. See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226, 234 n.ll (5th Cir. 1998)
(suggesting that the Supreme Court has indicated in dicta that the Bill of Attainder
Clause applies to corporations).
49. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 471-72 (1977).
50. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 450, 454 n.29 (1965) (stating that
the legislature can use shorthand phrases in place of a list of general characteristics, but
the substitution must be a semantically equivalent one). See the U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8
for the list of Congress's enumerated powers.
51. 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
52. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 437.
53. Id. at 450.
54. See Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
55. 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
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tion by altering his activities.56 Similarly, a statute that prohibited
nonregistrants of the draft from obtaining educational financial aid
was upheld in Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest
Research Group.57 The statute allowed a thirty-day grace period in
which nonregistrants could comply with registration requirements
and again become eligible for aid. 58 As a result, the Court found
that the individuals could avoid the act's operation and were not
sufficiently specified by the act.59 The Court thus found that a stat
ute may designate a specific group without violating the Bill of At
tainder Clause if the group is broadly defined or if its members can
avoid the act by altering their activities.
Even when a statute mentions an individual by name, that
alone may not be sufficient to satisfy the specificity requirement nor
automatically invalidate an act as a bill of attainder. 60 In Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services ,61 a congressional act required
former President Nixon to relinquish an estimated 42 million pages
of documents and 880 tape recordings in order to preserve them
and make them available for judicial proceedings. 62 However, the
Court found that designating Nixon by name alone did not satisfy
the specificity requirement. 63 The Court reasoned that while the
first section of the act dealt only with former President Nixon, the
second section focused on creating a commission to study the feasi
bility of preserving materials of all future presidents and federal of
ficials for their historical value.64 Furthermore, the Court noted
that presidential papers of other former presidents were already
preserved in libraries and therefore did not need to be obtained.65
The Court concluded that Nixon was classified as "a legitimate class
of one,"66 and, therefore, Congress could single him out in legisla
See id. at 88.
57. 468 U.S. 841, 859 (1984).
58. See id. at 849.
59. See id.
60. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 471 (1977); Selective
Servo Sys., 468 U.S. at 851. But see Note, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A
Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330, 353 (1962) (sug
gesting that singling out a person or specified group for the imposition of burdens is in
itself indicative of punishment).
61. 443 U.S. 425 (1977).
62. See id. at 430.
63. See id. at 471-72.
64. See id. at 472.
65. See id. The Court also noted that there was "an imminent danger that the
tape recordings would be destroyed," impliedly by Nixon himself. Id.
66. Id.
56.
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tion without implicating the Bill of Attainder Clause.67
When a legislative act operates with sufficient specificity to
bring it within the Bill of Attainder Clause, the second prong of the
bill of attainder test must be considered. This second prong re
quires that the specific individual or group targeted must have legis
lative punishment imposed upon it.
2.

What Is Legislative Punishment?

In a broad sense, punishment may be defined as "any fine, pen
alty, or confinement inflicted upon a person by the authority of the
law and the judgment and sentence of a court, for some crime or
offense committed by him, or for his omission of a duty enjoined by
law."68 Punishment operates "to reprimand the wrongdoer [and] to
deter others,"69 but may serve other goals including retribution, re
habilitation, or prevention. 70 Regardless of the intended goal, pun
ishment imposed upon a specified individual or group by the
legislature without the benefit of a judicial trial violates the Bill of
Attainder Clause. Thus, to constitute a bill of attainder, a legisla
tive act must "inflict punishment"71 in addition to meeting the spec
ificity requirement. 72
Since most legislation has adverse effects on individuals or
groups, it is not enough that "the [a]ct imposes burdensome conse
quences"73 to constitute punishment. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court has formulated a three-part test to determine whether legis
67. See id. at 484. The Court reached this result, in part, to avoid bill of attainder
challenges "whenever a law imposes undesired consequences on an individual or on a
class that is not defined at a proper level of generality." Id. at 469-70. The Supreme
Court indicated that the bill of attainder would not be implicated simply because a
legislative act has a negative effect on an individual or group since the Bill of Attainder
Clause "was not intended to serve as a variant of the equal protection doctrine." Id. at
471; see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 n.9 (1995) (stating that
Congress usually acts by laws of general application, but that private bills are common
and permissible so long as they do not violate the Bill of Attainder Clause).
68. BLACK'S LAW DICITONARY 1234 (6th ed. 1990).
69. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603,630 (1960) (Douglas, I., dissenting) (citing
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958».
70. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965). One important purpose
of criminal punishment is achieved through incapacitation-to "depriv[e] the party of
the power to do future mischief." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 11-12.
71. Brown, 381 U.S. at 456-60. See, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303,
315 (1946); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 320 (1867).
72. See supra Part I.e.l for a discussion of the specificity requirement.
73. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 472 (1977).
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lative punishment exists in the bill of attainder context. 74 First, the
"historical test" examines whether the deprivation is the kind of
punishment traditionally prohibited by the Clause.75 Next, the
"functional test" examines whether the act, "viewed in terms of the
type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to
further nonpunitive legislative purposes."76 Finally, the third con
sideration is the "motivational test," which examines "whether the
legislative record evinces a congressional intent to punish."77 How
ever, whether each part of the test establishes a requirement for
punishment, or whether satisfaction of anyone of the three parts is
determinative of punishment by itself has not been clearly
articulated. 78
a.

The historical test

Under the historical test, the Supreme Court has considered
the nature of the first laws deemed to be bills of attainder.79 This
inquiry examines the nature of bills of attainder in England and in
the colonies to determine what traditionally constituted punish
ment. 80 Such punishments have included execution, imprisonment,
banishment, the confiscation of property, and bars to employment
in particular fields. 81 Even if punishment was less than death, the
act was termed a bill of pains and penalties and was still prohibited
by the Bill of Attainder Clause. 82
An example of one of the first bill of attainder laws was a law
enacted by the State of Missouri when it ratified its constitution in
1865. The constitution contained a provision that worked to ex
clude ex-Confederates from political offices and other professions,
74. See id. at 474-78. See, e.g., Selective Servo Sys. V. Minnesota Pub. Interest
Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 852 (1984).
75. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 474.
76. Id. at 475-76.
77. Id. at 478; see also United States V. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 308-14 (1946).
78. See supra notes 75-77 for a discussion of the three-part test to determine
whether legislative punishment exists and infra Part IV.C for a discussion of the three
part test's limitations.
79. See, e.g., Selective Servo Sys., 468 U.S. at 847-48; Hawker V. New York, 170
U.S. 189, 191 (1898).
80. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473-75.
81. See id. at 474. See supra note 26 and accompanying text for other examples
of punishments.
82. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1867); see also Ex parte
Law, 15 F. Cas. 3, 11 (D.CS.D. Ga. 1866) (No. 8126); Ogden V. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 213 (1827); Fletcher V. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87,138 (1810) (stating that "[a]
bill of attainder may affect the life of an individual, or may confiscate his property, or
may do both").
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including those of attorney, priest, or other clergy.83 In Cummings
v. Missouri,84 the Supreme Court invalidated the state's constitu
tional provision as a bill of attainder. 85 The provision required can
didates and those already holding the statutorily defined positions
to take "test oath[s]"86 professing their loyalty to the United States
and swearing that they had never sympathized with or engaged in
the rebellion. 87 Any person defined by the statute had the choice of
taking the oath or losing his position. 88
In Cummings, a Missouri priest had not taken the oath, was
convicted of teaching and preaching, and was ultimately fined and
imprisoned. 89 The Court noted that while it was not uncommon or
unreasonable for England and France to require test oaths for of
fice in the past, those oaths were always limited to affirmations of
present beliefs.90 Missouri, however, had enacted a "retrospective"
oath that punished individuals for past acts which had "no possible
relation to their fitness for those pursuits."91 The Court acknowl
edged that Missouri had a legitimate interest in determining the
qualifications of its offices, but an exclusion from office could not
be based on an individual's past actions if there was no such rela
tion to the individual's fitness to hold office.92
Thus, in one of the first significant cases regarding the Bill of
Attainder Clause, the. Supreme Court broadly defined what consti
tuted punishment, holding that "[t]he deprivation of any rights, civil
or political, previously enjoyed, may be punishment, the circum
stances attending and the causes of the deprivation determining this
fact."93 Such deprivations may include:
83. See Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 317 (noting that the Constitution referred
specifically to any "office of honor [or] trust").
84. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
85. See id. at 316, 332.
86. A test oath· is "[a]n oath required to be taken as a criterion of the fitness of
the person to fill a public or political office; but particularly an oath of fidelity and
allegiance (past or present) to the established government." BLACK'S LAW DICTION
ARY 1477 (6th. ed. 1990).
87. See Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 316-17.
88. See id. at 317.
89. See id. at 316.
90. See id. at 318. An oath requirement is valid if it requires a party to swear to
have not committed a prohibited act since the passage of that act. By contrast, a retro
spective oath requires a pledge that the prohibited act was never committed and "would
affect every hour of his past life." Ex parte Law, 15 F. Cas. 3, 14 (D.CS.D. Ga. 1866)
(No. 8126).
91. Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 318-19.
92. See id. at 319.
93. Id. at 320.
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Disqualification from office . . . as in cases of conviction upon
impeachment.... [or] [d]isqualification from the pursuits of a
lawful avocation ... .
. . . [1]n the pursuit of happiness all avocations, all honors, all
positions, are ... rights ... all equal before the law. Any depriva
tion or suspension of any of these rights for past conduct is pun
ishment, and can be in no otherwise [sic] defined. 94

The Cummings Court did not focus on whether the state could pre
scribe avocation qualifications, but instead focused on whether the
qualifications imposed punishment, and thus constituted a bill of
attainder. 95
In Ex parte Garland,96 a similar case decided in the same term,
the Court examined a congressional act that exacted an oath from
those who would practice law in the Supreme Court, any circuit and
district courts, and the Court of Claims. 97 The Court struck down
the law on the same grounds as in Cummings. 98 However, even at
this early date, the punishment requirement was debated. 99 The
dissents in both Cummings and Garland argued that legislatures
have the power to establish qualification standards for political of
fices and the legal profession. 1°O Therefore, the oaths were not con
94. Id. at 320-22.
95. See id. at 318-19.
96. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
97. See id. at 374-75.
98. See id. at 380.
99. See id. at 382 (Miller, J., dissenting). Justice Miller was joined by four others
in a dissent that applied to both Cummings and Garland. Referring to Garland, but
"speak[ing] to principles equally applicable [to Cummings]," Justice Miller noted that
the act could not constitute a bill of attainder because it did not "attaint the blood" of
its target, rendering him unable to inherit or will his possessions; establish a conviction
and sentence passed by legislative measure; exist absent a previous law requiring pun
ishment for the "offense"; and it did not result from an investigation or determination
of gUilt made in the absence of the "offender" or without recognized rules of evidence.
See id. at 383, 387-88 (Miller, J., dissenting). Significantly, the dissenters maintained
that the legislative acts did not designate a person or group of persons with sufficient
specificity and did not inflict punishment. See id. at 389-90 (Miller, J., dissenting).
Rather, the acts were proper in that they served to protect the public from the future
harms of ex-Confederates and the required oaths were considered "prospective in na
ture." Id. at 391 (Miller, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the dissenters argued that the
mere fact that a qualification is not attainable by everyone does not make it punish
ment. See id. at 395 (Miller, J., dissenting). The act did not deprive the attorney of "an
absolute right," but of "a privilege conferred by law on a person who complies with the
prescribed conditions," and which depends on the continued possession of good moral
character and skill. See id. at 384 (Miller, J., dissenting).
100. See supra 99 for these arguments.
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trary to the Constitution,lol Later cases would find the dissents'
arguments to be valid justifications for upholding state statutes
challenged, inter alia, as bills of attainder,lo2
Another type of statutory punishment that the Supreme Court
has deemed to constitute punishment in a historical sense is where a
regulation effectively forecloses the possibility of engaging in a par
ticular occupation. In United States v. Lovett,103 the statute at issue
was an appropriations bill that provided that three individuals, who
had been working for the government, would lose their compensa
tion unless reappointed by the President,l04 The act did not ex
pressly prohibit the named individuals from working for the
government because they were thought to be "subversives";lo5 ac
cording to the Court, however, it was sufficient that the act had
such an effect,l06 Because the so-called "appropriations bill" af
fected the individuals by creating a "'perpetual exclusion' from a
chosen vocation," it was found to be legislative punishment. 107
In part because the historical test for legislative punishment by
itself provides a narrow view of what constitutes punishment, and
because the Supreme Court was aware of the risk of creative legis
lation that effectively punishes, the Court developed the second test
for legislative punishment: the functional test.
b.

The functional test: drawing the line between nonpunitive goals
and punishment

The functional test is another means of determining whether a
legislative act is punitive. This test attempts to distinguish between
a permissive legislative regulation as opposed to a nonpermissive
punitive action based on "the type and severity of the burdens im
101. See supra 99 for discussion of the Cummings and Garland cases.
102. See, e.g., Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 196-99 (1898); Dent v. West
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 125-28 (1889). See infra Part I.C.2.b.i for a discussion of whether
a legislative act is punitive under the functional test.
103. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
104. See id. at 305 & n.1. Section 304 of the Urgent Deficiency Appropriations
Act provided: "No part of any appropriation, allocation, or fund ... shall be used, after
November 15, 1943, to pay any part of the salary, or other compensation for the per
sonal services, of Goodwin B. Watson, William E. Dodd, Junior, and Robert Morss
Lovett ...." Id.
105. See id. at 311 n.3 (defining subversive activity as "conduct intentionally de
structive of or inimical to the Government of the United States").
106. See id. at 316-17. The act was labeled as an appropriations measure, but it
named and withdrew the salaries of three United States government workers because
Congress believed them guilty of subversive activities. See id. at 311-12.
107. See id. at 316 (quoting Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333,377 (1867».
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posed."108 Through its decisions, the Supreme Court has indicated
that certain kinds of legislation that appear to be punitive are in fact
furthering nonpunitive goals such as developing qualification stan
dards and preventing future harms.
1.

Preventing future harms

The Constitution provides Congress with an extensive list of
powers that has been interpreted and limited in scope by the
Supreme Court. 109 However, constitutional limits on state and fed
eral power have not prohibited Congress or the states from legislat
ing in the area of businesses and occupations. l1O For example, a
state may legitimately prescribe qualifications for a profession, such
as the medical profession, if those qualifications are related to the
profession and reasonably attainable.1l1 When West Virginia re
quired its physicians to graduate from medical schools before licen
sure, and prohibited unlicensed doctors from continuing their
practice, the statute was challenged under the Fourteenth Amend
ment. 112 But the Court held that a due process claim would not
stand where a "deprivation ... is ... imposed by the State for the
protection of society. "113
Soon after, a similar New York statute was challenged as a bill
of attainder in Hawker v. New York.t14 The statute made it a crime
for those with past felony convictions to practice as physicians. 115
The Court rejected the argument that the statute constituted legis
lative punishment by depriving convicted felons of the opportunity
to practice medicine because of their past conduct. 116 Instead, the
Court was persuaded that the character of a physician was a factor
necessary to determine if he was qualified; therefore, the legislation
108. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 475 (1977).
109. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995) (commerce clause); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (taxing
power).
110. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 527-28 nn.25-27 (1934) (providing
examples of various business regulations that have been within Congress's powers).
111. See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889).
112. See id. at 121 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 which reads: "[n]o state
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
113. Id. at 122. The Court reasoned that "[t]he power of the State to provide for
the general welfare of its people authorizes it to prescribe all such regulations as, in its
judgment, will secure ... them against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity as
well as of deception and fraud." Id.
114. 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
115. See id. at 190.
116. See id. at 191-92.
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was a permissible exercise of state power to regulate a matter of
public health.!17 In a later case, the Court stated that:
The question in each case where unpleasant consequences are
brought to bear upon an individual for prior conduct, is whether
the legislative aim was to punish that individual for past activity
[and is therefore prohibited], or whether the restriction of the
individual comes about as a relevant incident to a regulation of a
present situation, such as the proper qualifications for a profes
sion [and is therefore allowed].118

With the precedent provided by Hawker and Dent,119 a statute
could limit the availability of some professions to certain individu
als through the use of qualification standards even though legisla
tive exclusions of individuals from chosen occupations had been
historically regarded as unconstitutional punishment under Cum
mings .120 The legislature could now assert the need to establish em
ployment restrictions in the interest of protecting society from
potential harms and avoid the Bill of Attainder Clause.
However, as a result of Hawker and Dent, it became increas
ingly difficult to determine whether a qualification standard consti
tuted punishment, or whether it was a legitimate legislative act
created with the "intention . . . to forestall future dangerous
acts. "121 In some cases, qualification standards were permitted if
the legislature was operating on the rational understanding that cer
tain individuals, with particular political or business affiliations,
posed a harm to the national economy122 or other governmental
interest.123
In American Communications Ass'n v. Douds,124 the Court
found that an act that limited the ability of communists to hold of
fices in labor unions was not a bill of attainder. While the act pro
vided that no labor union petitions would be considered by the
National Labor Relations Board unless officers filed an affidavit
with the Board swearing that they were not members of the Com
117.
118.
119.
120.
attainder.
121.
122.
123.
victs from
124.

See id. at 193-94.
De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960).
See supra 111-113 and accompanying text for a discussion of Dent.
See supra Part 1.C.2.a for a discussion of the historical test regarding bills of
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,414 (1950).
See id. at 392.
See De Veau, 363 U.S. at 158-59 (sustaining a state law prohibiting ex-con
holding positions in labor organizations that represent employment).
339 U.S. 382 (1950).
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munist Party,125 the act was deemed constitutional because it was
within Congress's power to eliminate the risk of political strikes in
labor unions that could potentially harm commerce. The Court
found that Congress made a rational determination that union of
ficers who belonged to the Communist Party were more likely to
use their power to bring about political strikes,126 therefore con
cluding that the legislation was reasonably related to its goaL 127
The Court pointed out that this case was distinct from the
other bill of attainder questions it had faced since the individuals
were not being punished for past actions, but were only subject to a
possible loss of position because of a "substantial ground for the
congressional judgment that their beliefs and loyalties will be trans
formed into future conduct."l28 Even though the conclusion was
based on the Communist Party's history of conduct, the Court
found that the conclusion was not altered because the act was "in
tended to prevent future action rather than to punish past
action."129
Although the Court upheld the statute in Douds, in United
States v. Brown,130 the Court held that a congressional amendment
to the same statute that made it a crime for a recent Communist
Party member to be a union officer, as opposed to merely hindering
the effectiveness of a labor union with Communist officers, consti
tuted a bill of attainder. l3l Later cases also questioned the Douds
decision, although the case was never formally overtumed.132
125. See id. at 385-86.
126. See id. at 391.
127. See id. at 390-91. In dissent, Justice Black argued that "[N]ever before has
this Court held that the Government could for any reason attaint persons for their
political beliefs or affiliations. It does so today." Id. at 449 (Black, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 413 (citing United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) and Cummings
v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867), where those subject to the oaths of loyalty
could never hold the positions because the question of their past loyalty would never
change).
129. See Douds, 339 U.S. at 413. The Court further emphasized that the mem
bers were not being punished for past conduct since if they were to remove themselves
from the activities of the Communist Party, they would again become eligible for union
office. See id. at 414.
130. 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
131. See id. at 438-40.
132. See Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 76 (1969). The petitioner in
Bryson sought to have a conviction under the statute in question in Douds overturned
after Brown was decided. See id. at 65-66. However, the conviction was based on his
filing a fraudulent affidavit and the Court found that where the defendant has acted
fraudulently, the constitutionality of the underlying statute was irrelevant. See id. at 68.
In dissent, Justice Douglas stated, "Whatever may be said technically about any remain
ing vitality of the Douds case, it obviously belongs to a discredited regime, though, like
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Nevertheless, the year after Douds was decided, the Supreme
Court reiterated the notion that merely because Congress has con
sidered past conduct of an individual or group when drafting legis
lation, it does not follow that Congress is punishing; even past
(dis)loyalty may reasonably relate to the "present and future [pub
lic] truSt."133 As a result, the Court upheld a California statute that
required political candidates in Los Angeles to take an oath that
they had never advocated, taught, or affiliated with any organiza
tion that advocated the overthrow of the government. 134 The Court
found that the limitation did not constitute punishment because it
merely established qualification standards that were reasonably re
lated to public employment.135
Similarly, other cases allowed the legislature to prevent per
ceived future harms by enacting statutes that barred aliens from
certain occupations even though the Constitution generally disal
lowed such action under the Fourteenth Amendment. 136 In addi
tion, proscriptions against certain lines of business were also
allowed, despite bill of attainder claims, to guard against the
"tempting opportunities" to commit harmful acts with which indi
viduals might be presented.137 For instance, a statute may legiti
mately be designed to deal with "the probability or likelihood" that
a bank director would be tempted to use his influence at the bank
to involve the bank or its customers in securities when the bank
director was also an employee of a securities firm.1 38 Another stat
ute, which prohibited ex-felons from holding labor union positions,
was found to be a legitimate guard against the probability that ex
felons in union positions would lead to corrupt practices by the
union.13 9 Thus, the Supreme Court has suggested that legislative
Plessy v. Ferguson ... it has never been officially overruled." Id. at 76 (Douglas, J.
dissenting).
133. Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, no (1951).
134. See id.
135. See id. at no, n2 (distinguishing Cummings and Garland as cases where the
legislation was not intended to provide standards or qualifications for employment).
136. See Ohio v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927) (upholding an ordinance
prohibiting licensure of aliens to maintain billiard halls); see also Truax v. Raich, 239
U.S. 33 (1915) (striking down a statute that prohibited employers from employing aliens
in more than twenty percent of their workforce); Pearl Assurance Co. v. Harrington, 38
F. Supp. 411 (D. Mass.), affd per curiam, 313 U.S. 549 (1941).
137. Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441, 449 (1947).
138. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,392 (1950) (citing
Board of Governors, 329 U.S. at 447, which held that section 32 of the Banking Act of
1933 was not unconstitutional even though it prohibited partnership members in securi
ties firms from simultaneously serving as bank directors).
139. See De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 147 (1960) (finding state statute
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punishment might not exist where Congress acted reasonably to
prevent future harms.
11.

Other non punitive legislation

Additional Supreme Court opinions have emphasized other
nonpunitive legislative goals when finding that a bill of attainder
did not exist. For instance, in Selective Service System v. Minnesota
Public Interest Research Group,140 the Court found that the act in
question served the purpose of encouraging males to register for
the draft and more fairly allocating federal aid to those "willing to
meet their responsibilities to the United States."141 The Court has
also upheld statutes requiring deportation, since deportation does
not constitute punishment,142 Rather, deportation is deemed to be
a legitimate exercise of congressional power "to fix the conditions
under which aliens are to be permitted to enter and remain in this
country."143 A provision of the Social Security Act was likewise
upheld despite a claim that the termination of benefits to deported
aliens constituted punishment without a judicial trial. l44 The sanc
tion was deemed to be a "mere denial of a noncontractual govern
mental benefit."145 The provision served the purpose of providing
better administration of the Social Security Act because there was
"[n]o affirmative disability or restraint ... imposed."146 Accord
ingly, the provision did not constitute unconstitutional punish
ment. 147 In Nixon, the Act under scrutiny also did not fail the
functional test because Congress had a legitimate interest in secur
ing potential evidence for a criminal trial and preserving historical
prohibiting ex-felons from working as labor union representatives to be constitutional
given the evidence that waterfront crime was "largely due to ... [t]he presence on the
waterfront of convicted felons in many influential positions").
140. 468 U.S. 841 (1984). See also supra 57-58 and accompanying text for a dis
cussion of Selective Servo Sys. V. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group.
141. See id. at 854.
142. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 616 (1960); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S.
522, 530-31 (1954); Fong Yue TIng v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893).
143. Flemming, 363 U.S. at 616 (citing Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 709, which
defined deportation as "the removal of an alien out of the country, simply because his
presence is deemed inconsistent with the public welfare, and without any punishment
being imposed"); see also Galvan, 347 U.S. at 531.
144. See Flemming, 363 U.S. at 613. In Flemming, the statute denied benefits to
those who had engaged in subversive activities. See id. at 618 & n.1O. Nestor was de
ported for being a Communist, and then was denied benefits under the Social Security
Act. See id. at 605.
145. Id. at 617.
146. Id.
147. See id.
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documents. 148
When determining if punishment exists, the Court has consid
ered other factors besides the presence of a nonpunitive goal, such
as whether the deprivation in question is absolute or offers a means
of avoiding its effect. In American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds,149 for example, the challenged statute required affirmations
by union officers that they were not Communist Party members,
but did not absolutely forbid them from holding union office if they
did not make the affirmation.1so Rather, the Act only made it more
difficult for the union to remain effective if it chose to retain of
ficers who did not comply with the statute, by limiting review by the
National Labor Relations Board to only those unions with affirma
tions on file. 1S1 As a result, the legislation did not impose punish
ment. 152 In another case dealing with the Communist Party, the
Supreme Court again refused to find a bill of attainder since the
legislative sanctions were escapable. 153 Because members of the
party could discontinue their practices within the group, thereby
not being subject to the Act, the Court held the Act did not punish
party members.1s4 The Supreme Court later appeared to back
away from the escapability of a statute as indicative of whether the
legislation constituted punishment. 1ss However, when the issue
arose again, the Court returned to its position that the presence of
an escape route was evidence that the statute was nonpunitive and
therefore not a bill of attainder. 1s6
148. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 477-78 (1977). See
supra Part 1.C.2.b for a discussion of the functional test.
149. 339 U.S. 382 (1950). See supra 124-129 and accompanying text for a discus
sion of Douds.
150. See id. at 414 (stating that "there is no one who may not, by a voluntary
alteration of the loyalties which impel him to action, become eligible to sign the
affidavit").
151. See id. at 390.
152. See id. at 413-14.
153. See Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 88 (1961) (upholding the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950
which required associations engaging in communist activities to register with the
Board).
154. See id.
155. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 457 n.32 (1965) (stating that
neither Communist Party nor Douds require "inescapability as an absolute prerequisite
to a finding of attainder ... [and that] an absolute rule would have flown in the face of
explicit precedent, Cummings v. State of Missouri ... as well as the historical back
ground of the ... prohibition").
156. See Selective Servo Sys. V. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S.
841, 853 (1984). The Court found that "[a] statute that leaves open perpetually the
possibility of qualifying for aid does not fall within the historical meaning of ... punish
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Even when legislation involves some asserted legitimate goal,
the restrictions may still constitute punishment. 157 Consequently,
legislation does not avoid bill of attainder status merely by asserting
a nonpunitive goaL Neither does the severity of the effects of an
act determine whether it qualifies as punishment. 15S As a result,
"each case has turned on its own highly particularized context. "159
However, in determining whether a statute is penal, a controlling
factor is the "evident purpose of the legislature."l60 Thus, the moti
vational test has been developed to ascertain the legislature's pur
pose for enacting questionable legislation.
c.

The motivational test: legislative intent

The Supreme Court has required a high standard of evidence
to indicate a punitive legislative intent since "mudicial inquiries
into Congressional motives are at best a hazardous matter, and
when that inquiry seeks to go behind objective manifestations it be
comes a dubious affair indeed."161 Thus, the Court has been hesi
tant to strike down congressional enactments as bills of attainder
without "unmistakable evidence of punitive intent. "162 Generally,
the Court has been unwilling to find such strong evidence of
intent.163
In Nixon, the Court found that the legislative record did not
ment." Id. The Court distinguished Cummings and Garland on the grounds that in
those cases one's status as an ex-Confederate was "irreversible." Id. at 851. In Selective
Servo Sys., however, applicants could simply register for the draft to avoid the legisla
tion's negative effects. See id.
157. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 458-60. The Brown Court criticized the Court in
Douds for concluding that if an act is not purely retributive, it does not constitute pun
ishment. See id. at 460.
158. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 616 n.9 (1960).
159. Id. at 616.
160. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958).
161. Flemming, 363 U.S. at 617 (requiring "only the clearest proof' to establish
punitive intent). See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 478-82
(1977); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (181O) (stating that "it is not on
slight implication and vague conjecture that the legislature is to be pronounced to have
transcended its powers").
162. See Selective Servo Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S.
841,856 n.15 (1984) (quoting Flemming, 363 U.S. at 619).
163. See Flemming, 363 U.S. at 618-19 (finding no bill of attainder where a denial
of social security benefits to deported aliens was not based solely on the deportations,
but on the grounds for the deportations); see also Nixon, 433 U.S. at 478. But see Flem
ming, 363 U.S. at 633 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that the aim of the act was
clearly to legislatively take away property on the grounds of "act[ing] in a certain way
or embrac[ing] a certain ideology").

292

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:271

suggest punitive intent toward former President Nixon. 164 In refus
ing to strike down the legislation that forced Nixon to relinquish his
presidential papers, the Court considered the transcripts of Senate
and House Committee Reports and found that the reports failed to
show punitive intent.165 The reports instead reaffirmed the
nonpunitive legislative purpose of secunng presidential
documents. 166
When discerning punitive intent, the Court has considered the
extent to which other less burdensome alternatives were available
to achieve the same nonpunitive objectives, but were nevertheless
rejected by the legislature.1 67 However, even when other measures
are possible, the Court usually gives deference to Congress's chosen
means of regulating, so long as the decision was "rational and
fairminded. "168
Despite the obstacles to proving punitive legislative intent,
there have been cases where the high evidentiary standard was
met.1 69 In United States v. Lovett,170 for example, the Supreme
Court found the requisite intent and struck down a congressional
act upon evidence that included the language of the act and the
circumstances of its passageP1 The evidence in that case showed
that the legislature virtually conducted its own trial of the specified
individuals with a predetermined sentence.1 72 In 1938, the House
had created a Committee on Un-American Activities which con
ducted investigations and compiled lists of people whom it believed
were involved in subversive activities, focusing particularly on those
working for the government.1 73 The head of the committee, Con
164. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 478. The "[r]eports thus cast no aspersions on appel·
lant's personal conduct and contain no condemnation of his behavior as meriting the
infliction of punishment." Id. at 479.
165. See id. at 478-80.
166. See id. at 478-79.
167. See id. at 482-83.
168. See id. Nixon argued that a judicial alternative whereby the Attorney Gen
eral could bring a suit if he believed that historical presidential materials fell into the
hands of an unreliable custodian would achieve the same ends without implicating the
Bill of Attainder Clause. See id. at 483. Given the former President's objections to
judicial efforts to recover the documents, the Court concluded that the Congress "might
well have decided that the carefully tailored law ... would be less objectionable [to
Nixon] than the alternative that he ... appear[ed] to endorse." Id.
169. See, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); Cummings v. Missouri,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
170. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
171. Id. at 308-13.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 308.

2000]

REGULATION OR UNCONSTITUTIONAL PUNISHMENT

293

gressman Dies, told the House that thirty-nine individuals, includ
ing the three who eventually brought a claim, were not suited to
"hold a Government position" and suggested a refusal by Congress
to "appropriate money for their salaries."174 Eventually, the Ap
propriations Committee determined that the three employees were
subversives and a bill was passed to eliminate their salaries. 175 The
evidence was undeniable that Congress had decided the guilt of the
individuals and constructed legislation that would in effect punish
them for their subversive activities. 176 As such, the Court found
that the act constituted a bill of attainder.177 Since Lovett, no other
bill of attainder challenge has succeeded on a finding of punitive
legislative intent. In fact, no other bill of attainder challenge has
been successful.
In summary, for a finding of a bill of attainder, the Supreme
Court requires that an act specifically target an individual for pun
ishment. Whether an act punishes an individual in the bill of attain
der context depends on whether the act creates a restriction
historically regarded as punishment, has a punitive effect, or was
enacted with the intent to punish.
Recently, Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of
1996,l18 which contains a provision that singles out the BOCs and
restricts their ability to enter the long distance and telecommunica
tions equipment markets. The BOCs have challenged the constitu
tionality of the Act, in part as a bill of attainder, because it
specifically mentions the BOCs by name and places limits on their
ability to enter lines of employment. The BOCs allege that the re
strictions qualify as legislative punishment prohibited by the Bill of
Attainder Clause.

174. Id. at 309.
175. See id. at 309-12.
176. See id. at 309. An examination of the congressional debates revealed that
members referred to the seriousness of the "charges" or "indictments," and discussed
the "guilt" of the individuals. See id. Later, an Appropriations Committee held hear
ings in which the Dies Committee presented evidence against the employees, who
although present, were without counsel. See id. at 310-11.
177. See id. at 316.
178. See infra note 179.
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THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996179

The History and Purpose of the Act

The District Court for the District of Columbia initially im
posed a divestiture plan on the BOCs as part of an antitrust settle
ment between AT&T and the United States, in the form of a
consent decree. 180 The purpose of the Consent Decree's restric
tions was to "sever the relationship between this local monopoly
and the other, competitive segments of AT&T, and [to] ... thus
ensure ... that the practices which allegedly have lain heavy on the
telecommunications industry will not recur."181 However, the com
plexities of the AT&T divestiture and technological advances in the
telecommunications industry demanded that the district court mon
itor and repeatedly alter the requirements of the Consent De
cree. 182 With controversy over the increasing need for judicial
oversight of the mandates of the Consent Decree, Congress at
tempted to draft legislation that would resolve the inadequacies of
the Consent Decree.1 83 The ultimate solution was the Telecommu
nications Act of 1996.
An uncodified section of the Act eliminated the prohibitions
imposed by the Consent Decree,184 then reimposed restrictions in a
section entitled "Special Provisions Concerning Bell Operating
Companies" ("Special Provisions").185 In effect, the Act
"change [d] the administrator and specifierd] the rules by which
Judge Greene's long-running restrictions [could] be lifted."186
When the Act was passed, Congress made it clear that its general
purpose was to replace telecommunications monopolies and regula
179. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § l(a), 110 Stat. 56
(codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
180. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 223 (D.D.C. 1982).
181. See id.; see also supra notes 3-4, 6-7 and accompanying text for a discussion
of this consent decree.
182. See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226, 231 (5th Cir. 1998).
183. See id. The court noted that in his role with the Consent Decree, Judge
Greene had significant power to determine telecommunications policy and that promi
nent law reviews, newspapers, and business publications had named him the "telecom
munication's czar." Id. at 231 & n.5. Congress was concerned that this could be
considered a grant of "judicial nobility" in conflict with the Constitution, primarily, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. Id. at 231 & n.6.
184. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 601, 110 Stat.
143.
185. 47 U.S.C. §§ 271-276 (Supp. III 1997).
186. SBC Communications, Inc., 154 F.3d at 232.
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tions with competitive markets. 187 This would establish a "de-regu
latory national policy framework. "188 As such, the Act would
promote competition with the intended results being lower prices,
greater options, and higher quality service for telecommunications
customers.1 89 To achieve its goals, however, the Special Provisions
section placed a number of restrictions on the BOCs.

B.

The Effect of the Act Provisions 190

Among the general provisions of the Act is a requirement that
the RBOCs, as well as other telecommunications carriers, offer
nondiscriminatory access and interconnection to local competi
tors191 and "negotiate in good faith with such entities."192 In addi
tion, the Act sets forth a Special Provisions section that addresses
the BOCs specifically and establishes criteria that the BOCs must
meet to demonstrate that they have allowed for competition in an
area of service before they are permitted to enter a particular mar
ket. 193 The long distance market is one such market.1 94
Since the Act only requires that the BOCs meet the enumer
ated requirements, the Act does not exclude the BOCs from the
long distance market entirely, but rather demands that the follow
ing requirements be met before they may offer long distance serv
ices. 195 First, a BOC must show that there is already a facilities
based competitor present in the market. 196 To do so, the BOC must
187. See Bell Atlantic-New Jersey, Inc. v. Tate, 962 F. Supp. 608, 612 (D.N.J.
1997).
188. H.R. CONF. REp. No. 104-458, at 113 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
124,124.
189. See H.R. REp. No. 104-204, at 47-48 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
10,11.
190. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 271-276 (Supp. III 1997).
191. See id. § 251; see also Norman B. Beecher, The Telecommunications Act of
1996: Tackling the Twists and Turns of Technology, 26 COLO. LAW. 11 (1997) (discussing
the ambiguities raised by the terms of the Act and their implications).
192. Tate, 962 F. Supp. at 613; see also 47 U.S.c. §§ 251(c)(1), 252 (Supp. III
1997).
193. See 47 U.S.c. §§ 271-276 (Supp. III 1997).
194. See id. § 271.
195. See id. § 271(a).
196. See id. § 271(c)(1)(A). A facilities-based competitor is defined as a provider
of telephone exchange service to residential and business subscribers. See id. The Tele
communications Act further defines telephone exchange service as:
(A) service within a telephone exchange, or within a connected system of tele
phone exchanges within the same exchange area operated to furnish to sub
scribers intercommunicating service of the character ordinarily furnished by a
single exchange, and which is covered by the exchange service charge, or (B)
comparable service provided through a system of switches, transmission equip
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have "entered into one or more binding agreements ... approved
under ... [the Act, whereby] the [BOC] is providing access and
interconnection to its [own] network facilities for the network facili
ties of one or more unaffiliated competing providers of telephone
exchange service .... "197 Furthermore, the Act entails a "competi
tive checklist" that the access and interconnection service provided
by the BOC must comply with. 198
Additionally, the BOCs may not manufacture or otherwise
provide telecommunications or customer premises equipment un
less already authorized by the FCC to provide long distance serv
ices, and even then they may do so only through a separate
affiliate. 199 The Act further provides that the BOCs may not pro
vide electronic publishing unless it is done through a separate affili
ate. 2OO Finally, the Special Provisions limit the BOCs from
participating in alarm monitoring services. The alarm monitoring
market is off limits to the BOCs until February 8, 2001, unless the
BOC was already engaged in those services before November 30,
1995.201 As for the electronic publishing market, the BOCs could
not enter without meeting the statutory requirements until Febru
ary 8, 2000. 202 Any BOC seeking to enter a market before the spec
ified time was required to submit an application with the FCC
certifying that it fulfilled the requirements under the Act. 203 Subse
quently, the FCC could accept or deny the application. 204
ment, or other facilities ... by which a subscriber can originate and terminate
a telecommunications service.
Id. § 153(47).
197. Id. § 271(c)(1)(A).
198. See id. § 271(c)(2)(B)(i)-(xiv).
199. See id. § 273(a). The BOC is permitted to collaborate with a manufacturer
of customer premises or telecommunications equipment during the design and develop
ment of such equipment. See id. § 273(b)(1). The BOC is also permitted to engage in
research activities regarding the manufacturing of such equipment or enter royalty
agreements with other manufacturers. See id. § 273(b)(2)(A)-(B). A separate affiliate
is defined as "a corporation under common ownership or control with a Bell operating
company that does not own or control a [BOC] and is not owned or controlled by a
[BOC] ...." Id. § 274(i)(9).
200. See id. § 274(a). Electronic publishing includes "the dissemination, provi
sion, publication, or sale [of] ... news (including sports); entertainment (other than
interactive games); business, financial, legal, consumer, or credit materials; editorials,
columns, or features; advertising; photos or images; archival or research material; legal
notices or public records; scientific, educational, instructional, technical, professional,
trade, or other literary materials; or other like or similar information." Id. § 274(h)(1).
201. See id. § 275(a)(1)-(2).
202. See id. § 274(g)(2).
203. See id. § 271(d)(1).
204. See id. § 271(d)(3).
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In 1997, the FCC denied two BOC applications for entry into
restricted markets. The two companies that were denied entry,
SBC Communications, Inc. and BellSouth Corp., ultimately chal
lenged the restrictions imposed by the Special Provisions as a bill of
attainder. 205
III.

THE SPECIAL PROVISIONS BEFORE THE FIFTH AND
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS
In the Fifth Circuit, the Special Provisions206 of the Telecom
munications Act of 1996 were challenged as a bill of attainder by
SBC Communications, Inc., ("SBC Communications"), an RBOC,
and its subsidiaries.207 SBC Communications brought the suit after
the FCC, which is authorized to evaluate competition in restricted
markets before BOCs may enter, denied its application to enter an
Oklahoma long distance market.208 The FCC contended that the
statutory criteria under the Act had not been met. 209 In the district
court, the Special Provisions were found to be unconstitutional and
severable from the Act,2l0 but the Fifth Circuit reversed the
decision. 211
Earlier in 1998, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia considered a similar bill of attainder chal
lenge. 212 BellSouth Corporation ("BellSouth"),213 like SBC Com
munications, had filed an application with the FCC that was
denied. 214 BellSouth sought to enter the electronic publishing mar
ket, whereas SBC Communications sought to enter the long dis
tance market. 215 Subsequently, BellSouth challenged the
constitutionality of the Act's provision that focused on the elec
tronic publishing market, specifically, § 274.216 This section prohib
its a BOC from providing electronic publishing unless the BOC acts
205. See, e.g., SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 1998);
BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
206. 47 U.S.C. §§ 271-276 (Supp. III 1997). See supra Part II.B for a discussion of
the Special Provisions section of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
207. See SBC Communications, Inc., 154 F.3d at 233.
208. See id.
209. See id. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of the statutory criteria.
210. See SBC Communications, Inc., 154 F.3d at 233.
211. See id. at 247.
212. BeliSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
213. Although BeliSouth is not a BOC, as an RBOC and sole shareholder of two
BOCs, it had standing to bring a claim. See id. at 62.
214. See id. at 60 n.1.
215. See id. at 60-61.
216. See id.
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in conjunction with a separate affiliate or joint venture. 217 Initially,
the Consent Decree prohibited the BOCs from entering the "infor
mation services" market, which included electronic publishing. 2Is
However, in 1991, upon motion by the Department of Justice, the
district court lifted these restrictions. 219 Ultimately, the Telecom
munications Act reimposed some of the restrictions that had been
lifted. 220
In both cases the RBOCs alleged that the Special Provisions
were unconstitutional because they singled out the BOCs and in
flicted punishment by imposing restrictions on lines of business:
long distance service and electronic publishing.221 Both circuit
courts nonetheless held that the Special Provisions were
constitutional.222
A.

The Fifth Circuit Majority Opinion: A Prophylactic Measure

In SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC,223 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that the Special
Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 did not consti
tute a bill of attainder. 224 The court assumed that even if the Bill of
Attainder Clause was applicable to corporations, and that the Act
met the specificity requirement, the terms of the Special Provisions
nevertheless did not constitute punishment within the scope of the
Clause. 225 To determine whether the Special Provisions constituted
punishment, the court first examined the history of bills of attain
der. Upon examining the historical meaning of punishment, the
court determined that the Cummings and Garland cases did not
stand for an absolute constitutional prohibition on bars to employ
ment. 226 Rather, the four-vote dissents in those cases indicated that
the Supreme Court came close to holding that bars to employment
would be permissible if the prohibition was intended to prevent fu
217. 47 U.S.c. § 274(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
218. See BellSouth Corp., 144 F.3d at 60.
219. See id. (citing United States v. Western Electric Co., 767 F. Supp. 308
(D.D.C. 1991), affd, 993 F.2d 1572 (D.C. Cir. 1993».
220. See id. at 61.
221. See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226, 233 (5th. Cir. 1998)
(long distance services); BellSouth Corp., 144 F.3d at 60 (electronic publishing).
222. See SBC Communications, Inc., 154 F.3d at 234; BellSouth Corp., 144 F.3d at
67.
223. 154 F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 1998).
224. See id. at 234-35.
225. See id. at 235.
226. See id. at 236-37. See supra Part 1.C.2.a for a discussion of the Supreme
Court's holdings in Cummings and Garland.
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ture harmful acts.227
The court focused on the regulatory role of Congress, arguing
that cases like Dent and Hawker eventually developed the "exist
ence of a 'prophylactic' exception to the Bill of Attainder
Clause."228 Using language in Justice Frankfurter's dissent in
Lovett for support, the majority found that" '[p]unishment presup
poses . . . an act for which retribution is exacted.' "229 The court
described subsequent attainder cases addressed by the Supreme
Court as the "Frankfurtian phase," whereby every attainder chal
lenge was rejected at least in part because of the "prophylactic ex
ception."23o The court found the prophylactic exception to be
consistent with the modem rule that "legislation [that] has a legiti
mately nonpunitive function, purpose, and structure ... does not
constitute punishment . . . even where it imposes the historically
punitive sanction of barring designated individuals from engaging in
certain professions."231
The court also found that the cases following the Frankfurtian
phase suggested a trend toward a broader reading of the Bill of
Attainder Clause; however, it concluded that even in the Brown
case, the "exception" was preserved in dicta. 232 Consequently, the
court found that whether a particular punishment has been histori
cally regarded as implicating the Bill of Attainder Clause was not
conclusive of whether punishment existed for purposes of the
Clause.233 The court found that so long as an act "seeks to achieve
legitimate and nonpunitive ends and [is] not clearly the product of
punitive intent," it is not punishment. 234
The court found that the Special Provisions were not histori
cally punitive since they did not permanently bar the BOCs from a
227. See id. at 237.
228. Id. at 237-38. See supra Part LC.2.b.ii regarding other nonpunitive
legislation.
229. See id. at 238 (quoting United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 324 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
230. See id. at 238-39 (citing Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 367 U.S. 1,86-88 (1961); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960); De Veau v.
Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960); Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 722-23
(1951); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 413-14 (1950)). The
court acknowledged that some of these cases were based in part on a strict historical
interpretation of the bill of attainder, but that all maintained the "prophylactic excep
tion" developed by Frankfurter. See id. at 239.
231. Id. at 241.
232. See id. at 239-42.
233. See id. at 241.
234. [d. at 242 (quoting Dehainaut v. Pena, 32 F.3d 1066, 1071 (7th Cir. 1994)).

300

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:271

line of employment. 235 Although the Fifth Circuit acknowledged
that the requirements imposed were difficult for the BOCs to sat
isfy, it stated that compliance was not impossible. 236 Furthermore,
. the court determined that the prophylactic exception was satisfied
by the presence of the nonpunitive goal advanced by the Special
Provisions, namely, "ensur[ing] fair competition in the markets for
local service, long distance, telecommunications equipment, and in
formation services."237 The requirements would legitimately oper
ate to decrease the risk that the BOCs would practice anti
competitive behavior. 238
According to the majority, the third test for punishment, the
motivational test, was also not met. 239 The statutory language of
the Special Provisions did not suggest punitive intent.24o The court
did not find the requisite "smoking gun" evidence in the legislative
history to suggest that Congress intended to punish the BOCs for
past conduct. 241 Instead, the court found only "isolated references
in congressional debate to the Bell System's questionable business
practices prior to the [Consent Decree], which were [only] offered
as evidence of the general potential for abuse of local market
power."242
Finally, the court was persuaded that the Special Provisions
could not have been intended to be punitive in light of the role that
the BOCs played in their enactment. 243 Considerable lobbying oc
curred by the BOCs to open the markets immediately if possible, or
restrictively if necessary, in order to avoid the harsher Consent De
cree terms.244 The ultimate resolution, the Special Provisions, was
"a hard-fought compromise."245 The court found that "a legislative
quid pro quo on this level simply cannot be punitive for attainder
235. See id. at 242-43.
236. See id. at 243 n.27.
237. Id. at 243 (noting that even the requirements imposed by the Consent De
cree were not meant to be punitive).
238. See id. at 243-44.
239. See id.
240. See id. at 243.
241. See id.
242. Id.
243. See id. at 244.
244. See id. at 244 n.2B.
245. Id. at 244 (noting that the information services restriction was only partially
reimposed under § 274; the BOCs were inlmediately free to offer incidental out-of
region long distance service; and that the Act's ultimate goal was to remove all
restrictions).
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purposes."246

B. Judge Smith's Dissenting Opinion
The dissent in SBC Communications argued that the majority
created the prophylactic exception on its own.247 While the dissent
agreed that the Special Provisions specifically targeted the BOCs, it
found that this section also constituted an unconstitutional bill of
attainder because it punished the BOCs.248
First, the dissent contended that the Act fell within the scope
of historical punishment. 249 Since the post-Civil War era, and as
recently as the Supreme Court's latest finding of unconstitutionality
on attainder grounds, the Court has held and reiterated that the Bill
of Attainder Clause prohibits bars to various lines of employ
ment. 250 Because the historical punishment test was met, the dis
sent suggested that the court need not examine the issue any
further. 251 Inquiries into the legislative purpose would only be nec
essary if the historical test was not met. 252
The dissent determined that the retributive nature of an act
alone is not dispositive in determining whether an act constitutes
punishment. 253 The fact that the provisions have preventive goals
does not mean that the result is not unconstitutional punishment.254
In any event, the fact that Congress singled out the BOCs to the
exclusion of other companies undermined Congress's asserted goal
of keeping the market anti-competitive, and instead indicated that
Congress made a judgment that the BOCs were likely to commit
antitrust violations and therefore inflicted punishment to prevent
that possibility.255 The dissent, reasoning that an act may punish
246. Id.
247. See id. at 249 (Smith, J., dissenting). The dissent refers to the majority opin
ion as "stitching together a patchwork of concurrences and dissents and by brushing
aside binding Supreme Court majority opinions as 'aberrant' and 'unsensible'" and "an
nounc[ing] the discovery of a heretofore unrecognized exception." Id. at 247, 249
(Smith, J., dissenting).
248. See id. at 248-51 (Smith, J., dissenting).
249. See id. at 248 (Smith, J., dissenting).
250. See id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
251. See id. at 250 (Smith, J., dissenting). See infra Part III.D for a discussion of
Judge Sentelle's dissent in Bel/South Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
252. See id. at 250 (Smith, J., dissenting) (citing Selective Servo Sys. v. Minnesota
Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 853-54 (1984); Nixon v. Administrator of
Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,475-76 (1977)).
253. See id. at 250-51 (Smith, J., dissenting).
254. See id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
255. See id. at 251 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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even if it is avoidable, also rejected the theory that since Congress
afforded the BOCs a means of complying with the Act, the bar
from employment was nonpunitive. 256 Consequently, the "prophy
lactic exception" is a "chimera" because legislation punishing indi
viduals who are likely to do wrong constitutes a bill of attainder,
even though it is prophylactic. 257
Lastly, the dissent argued that the separation of powers princi
ple underlying the Bill of Attainder Clause would be undermined
unless the Special Provisions of the Act were considered a bill of
attainder, since the legislature would be performing a judicial role
by imposing punishment on the BOCS.258 According to the dissent,
it is irrelevant whether the BOCs played a role in enacting the bill
given the significance of this doctrine. 259
C.

The District of Columbia Circuit Majority Opinion

Like the Fifth Circuit, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia also held that there was no bill of attainder
violation. 260 First, the court assumed BelISouth had standing as a
corporation to bring a bill of attainder claim. 261 However, unlike
the Fifth Circuit, the court in BellSouth addressed the specificity
requirement. 262 The court found that this requirement was met
since the BOCs were specifically mentioned by name in the Special
Provisions. 263 The court went on to conclude, however, that the
Act did not punish the BOCs.264
As in SBC Communications, the court rejected the BOC's as
sertion that the restrictions constituted punishment historically for
bidden by the Bill of Attainder Clause. 265 The court reasoned that
the bill of attainder cases finding legislative bars from employment
to be punishment were unique and could be separated into two
256. See id. at 248-49 (Smith, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Bill of Attainder Clause can
not be avoided simply by inserting into the statute a means of escape.").
257. See id. at 251 (Smith, J., dissenting).
258. See id. at 252 (Smith, J., dissenting).
259. See id. at 253 (Smith, J., dissenting). The dissent analogized the consent of
the BOCs to consent to subject-matter jurisdiction. The legislation is unenforceable
irrespective of consent simply because it is a bill of attainder and Congress lacks the
power to create it. See id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
260. See BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58, 63-67 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
261. See id. at 63.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See id. at 64-67.
265. See id. at 64.
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groupS.266 First were the cases that dealt with ex-Confederates:
Cummings and Garland; and second were the cas~s that involved
Communists. 267 The common theme was that all four bills singled
out specific classes of persons based on their political beliefs. 268
According to the court, business restrictions such as those imposed
by § 274 of the Special Provisions could not constitute punishment
in a historical sense because the BOCs are not analogous to ex
Confederates or members of the Communist Party, who were sin
gled out for their political beliefs.269
Furthermore, any claim of historical punishment was under
mined by the fact that § 274 did not create a complete bar from
electronic publishing.27o Rather, it only required BellSouth to
restructure its method of entering the market by using a separate
affiliate. 271 The court found that such restructuring is not a suffi
cient restriction to rise to the level of a traditional restraint on
employment.272
According to the Bel/South court, the second prong of the pun
ishment test, the functional test, was the most important, because it
operates to prevent Congress from devising methods of legislative
punishment that have not been deemed to be punishment in a his
torical sense. 273 In addition, the functional test allows a court to
conclude that an act, despite a historic classification as punishment,
is not violative of the Bill of Attainder Clause given its nonpunitive
goalS. 274
The court determined that § 274, despite its specificity, was "a
rather conventional response to commonly perceived risks of anti
competitive behavior."275 In fact, the court could find no authority
266. See id.
267. See id.
268. See id. at 64-65; see also Tun Sloan, Creating Better Incentives Through Regu
lation: Section 271 of the Communications Act of 1934 and the Promotion of Local Ex
change Competition, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 309, 321 (1998) (noting that the Bill of
Attainder Clause seems "intended to protect individuals and groups from being singled
out for punishment because of their beliefs or political affiliations"); Note, Beyond Pro
cess: A Substantive Rationale for the Bill ofAttainder Clause, 70 VA. L. REv. 475 (1984)
(arguing for a restructuring of the Bill of Attainder inquiry to recognize the Clause's
purpose of protecting against punishment based on one's political activity or belief).
269. See BellSouth Corp., 144 F.3d at 65.
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. Id.
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that required it to consider specificity as part of its punishment
analysis. 276 In addition, the court found that BellSouth's assertion
of punitive purpose was undermined by § 274's location in a larger
act with a nonpunitive goal of promoting a competitive telecommu
nications market. 277
The court also rejected the view that Congress did not have a
rational reason for imposing § 274 other than to punish. 278 Instead,
it was likely that Congress, looking at the same evidence that com
pelled the district court to lift the information services ban, had
concluded that the BOCs' ability to monopolize the electronic pub
lishing market had to be limited. 279 The court also gave weight to
the fact that the Special Provisions section was not as severe as the
restrictions formerly placed on the BOCs by the Consent Decree in
concluding that the Act did not have a punitive purpose. 280 The
court contended that it was not applying a rational basis test to the
attainder claim to determine congressional purpose. 281 Instead, the
court required a rationalization that was "not merely reasonable,
but nonpunitive. "282 The court was also not persuaded by the argu
ment that § 274 was punitive in nature because it did not apply
equally to all local exchange carriers. 283 The court reasoned that
the singling out of the BOCs from all carriers could have been Con
gress's response to the BOCs' pervasiveness in the local service
markets, which created a greater risk of anticompetitive
behavior.284
Finally, the court briefly dealt with the third punishment test
and found that it also was not met. 285 In order for the legislative
intent test to be satisfied, BellSouth needed to show "unmistakable
276. See id. at 64.
277. See id. at 66.
278. See id.
279. See id.
280. See id. at 66 (noting that section 274 only applies to electronic publishing and
terminates in five years, whereas the Decree was broader and could last indefinitely,
and that the Special Provisions only require restructuring of the BOCs before entering
the markets, not an absolute exclusion from the markets).
281. See id. at 66-67.
282. Id. Under the rational basis test, the most lenient standard of review, "legis
lation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the
statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
283. See BeliSouth Corp., 144 F.3d at 67.
284. See id.
285. See id.
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evidence of punitive intent."286 According to the court, the "few
scattered remarks referring to anticompetitive abuses allegedly
committed by the BOCs in the past" could not establish the requi
site legislative intent.287
D. Judge Sentelle's Dissenting Opinion
Like the Fifth Circuit dissent, the dissent in BellSouth found
that the Special Provisions' § 274 constituted legislative punishment
and therefore was unconstitutional as a bill of attainder. 288
The dissent first argued that little more than specificity is
needed to constitute punishment. 289 Still, even if specificity alone
was not enough to create a bill of attainder, the dissent argued that
a preliminary finding of historical punishment in addition to the
specificity of the Act should be sufficient to conclude that the Act is
unconstitutional.290 The dissent found that, in accordance with
Supreme Court precedent, legislative bars from employment consti
tuted prohibited legislative punishment under the historical test.2 91
Addressing the second prong of the punishment test, which de
termines whether a nonpunitive legislative purpose exists, the dis
sent again took into account the specificity of the Act, since
according to Judge Sentelle, specificity is indicative of a punitive
purpose. 292 In fact, if it were not for the unique holding in Nixon,
where the former President was found to constitute a legitimate
class of one, it would be unnecessary to engage in a punishment
analysis in this case because the mere "imposition of a burden
solely on a class of individuals defined by name rather than by char
acteristic ... on its face bespeaks an intent to punish ...."293 Ac
cording to Judge Sentelle, since the BOCs were specifically named
in the Act, to the exclusion of other similarly situated companies, it
could be inferred that the Act was designed to punish the BOCs for
286. Id. (quoting Selective Servo Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group,
468 U.S. 841, 855-56 n.15 (1984) (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 u.S. 603, 619
(1960))).
287. Id.
288. See id. at 71-74 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
289. See id. at 72 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
290. See id. at 71-73 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
291. See id. at 72 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). The court determined that legislative
bars to employment were the most common kind of statute struck down by the
Supreme Court as bills of attainder. See id. at 72-73 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
292. See id. at 73 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
293. Id. at 72 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
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their past behavior. 294 As a result, the Act failed the second prong
of the test despite the existence of any asserted nonpunitive goal.295
Instead of naming the BOCs, Judge Sentelle suggested that Con
gress should have defined its focus in general terms to include "the
characteristics of local exchange carriers that create the risks of an
ticompetitive behavior."296 The Act also constituted punishment
regarding the information services provisions because it presented a
reimposition of restrictions that had already been lifted under the
regime of the Consent Decree.297
Finally, the Bel/South dissent considered the motivational fac
tor, which it regarded as the "least important" factor.298 Neverthe
less, the dissent took a broad approach to determine legislative
intent and found that the legislative record suggested that Congress
acted with the requisite intent to punish the BOCs.299 Although
remarks made during the Telecommunications Act's enactment
were not alone evidence of punitive intent,3oo a congressional mo
tive to punish could be discerned when the remarks were consid
ered in light of the Act's specificity and its "timing and apparent
triggering."301 Both the SBC Communications and Bel/South dis
sents contained strong arguments that viewed the restrictions im
posed by the Special Provisions as unconstitutional under the Bill of
Attainder Clause. Ultimately, however, both the Fifth Circuit and
the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Special Provisions
and § 274 of those provisions are not violative of the Bill of Attain
der Clause.
IV.

THE SPECIAL PROVISIONS CONSTITUTE A BILL
OF ArrAINDER

There are three potential obstacles to finding that the Special
Provisions section of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 consti
tutes an unconstitutional bill of attainder: (1) corporate standing,
294. See id. at 73 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
295. See id. (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
296. Id. (Sentelle, J., dissenting). It should be noted that the Special Provisions
do not apply to other local exchange carriers such as GTE Corporation and Southern
New England Telephone, even though GTE was subject to a less restrictive consent
decree prior to the Act. See id. at 67 & n.9.
297. See id. at 73 (Sentelle, J., dissenting); SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 154
F.3d 226, 232 (5th Cir. 1998).
298. See BellSouth Corp., 144 F.3d at 73 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
299. See id. (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
300. See id. (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
301. Id. (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
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(2) specificity, and (3) punishment. The first two are easily satis
fied. Indeed, the only serious issue is whether the Special Provi
sions section constitutes punishment in the Bill of Attainder
context.
A.

A Corporation Has the Required Standing to Invoke the Bill
of Attainder Clause

The Supreme Court has never ruled on whether a corporation
has standing to assert a Bill of Attainder claim. 302 However, it is
likely that a corporation would have the requisite standing.303 Not
only does recent dicta suggest that the Bill of Attainder Clause's
protections would extend to corporations,304 but the Supreme
Court has consistently included corporations within the scope of
other constitutional protections. 305
A corporation is "an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and
existing only in contemplation of law."306 Thus, whether a corpora
tion is entitled to the protection of a constitutional guarantee de
pends on the nature of the guarantee at issue. 307 Specifically,
purely personal guarantees are unavailable to a corporation be
cause the "'historic function' of ... [such] guarantee[s] has been
limited to the protection of individuals."308 Whether a guarantee is
"purely personal" turns on "the nature, history, and purpose of the
302. See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226, 234 n.ll (5th Cir.
1998).
303. See id.; BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
304. See SBC Communications, Inc., 154 F.3d at 234 & n.ll (citing Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 n.9 (1995), which suggested that the Bill of
Attainder Clause is implicated when laws affect "a single individual or firm"); see also
George Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392 U.S. 286, 290 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissent
ing) (stating that when a law "blacklists this family corporation," it has the same effect
as a bill of attainder).
305. Indeed, as early as 1819 the Supreme Court recognized that corporations
have constitutionally protected contract rights and that corporate franchises can only be
forfeited by trial and judgement. See, e.g., Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Wood
ward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). For a list of other cases in which the Court has
allowed corporations to assert constitutional protections see infra note 312.
The Court has also criticized the British Parliament for operating on the theory
that it was "omnipotent," and could therefore exercise "extraordinary power" to create
and destroy corporations. See Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U.S. 679, 684 (1877). The
Special Provisions do not threaten to destroy the BOCs; however, if allowed, they
would constitute an unchecked legislative power that could lead to more serious depri
vations with the potential to destroy corporations in the future.
306. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 636.
307. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978).
308. Ill. at 778 n.14 (citing United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-701 (1944)).
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particular constitutional provision. "309
However, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,310 the
Supreme Court stated that this analysis does not leave the govern
ment "free to define the rights of [corporations] without constitu
tional limit. Otherwise, corporations could be denied the
protection of all constitutional guarantees .... "311 Consequently,
many constitutional guarantees have been afforded to
corporations. 312
At least two Supreme Court Justices have suggested that a con
stitutional provision may apply to a corporation notwithstanding an
extensive history as a prohibition applicable to individuals. In
Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. ,313 the
Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against excessive fines does not apply between private parties, and
declined to consider whether the constitutional provision is also ap
plicable to corporations. 314 However, Justices O'Connor and Ste
vens, concurring in part and dissenting in part, addressed the
corporate standing issue and found that a corporation could invoke
the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 315 Their
opinion indicates that if the Supreme Court were to consider the
applicability of a constitutional provision to a corporation, more
than the mere historical fact that a constitutional provision has been
used primarily for individual protection may be required to find
that the provision is a "purely personal" guarantee.
Justices O'Connor and Stevens discussed the history of the Ex
cessive Fines Clause at length (which parallels the history of the Bill
of Attainder Clause) as a limitation on the government's ability to
309. Id.
310. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
311. Id. at 778 n.14.
312. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881 n.9 (1985)
(equal protection); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984)
(due process); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (searches and seizures);
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977) (double jeopardy); Vir
ginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976) (freedom of speech). But see, e.g., George Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392
U.S. 286, 288-89 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (finding that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination cannot be invoked by a corporation (quoting United
States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-99 (1944»); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338
U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (finding no right to privacy).
313. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
314. See id. at 276 n.22.
315. See id. at 284-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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punish and deter the conduct of individuals .316 Still, Justices
O'Connor and Stevens maintained that a corporation should be en
titled to claim the constitutional protection at issue in part because
a corporate entity would be capable of paying an excessive mone
tary fine (as opposed to, for example, remaining silent under the
Fifth Amendment).317
Likewise, in the Bill of Attainder context, a corporation would
be capable of being punished, at least where the punishment con
sists of a fine or ban from a line of employment. Additional
Supreme Court decisions regarding the applicability of constitu
tional provisions to corporations also suggests that the Court is not
concerned with who or what the provisions historically applied
to.318 Rather, the Court is concerned with the historical purpose of
the provision and whether corporate protection serves that
purpose.319
Furthermore, because the Bill of Attainder Clause is a "safe
guard against legislative exercise of the judicial function[,] or more
simply-trial by legislature," and corporations are subject to crimi
nal law, it is only natural that the prohibition against legislative
punishments be applicable to corporations. 32o Thus, whether the
Bill of Attainder Clause provides a protection that is historically
personal in nature is beyond the scope of this Note, it is likely that
the Clause would be applicable to corporations and could be in
voked by the BOCs.
B.

The Special Provisions Operate with Unprecedented
Specificity

The first prong of the Bill of Atainder inquiry requires that an
act operate with specificity.321 Undoubtedly, the Telecommunica
tions Act of 1996 singles out the BOCs. It does so in two ways.
316. See id. at 286-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(discussing the history of the Excessive Fines Clause).
317. See id. at 285 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
318. See, e.g., Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8
(1986) (emphasizing that "[c]orporations ... like individuals, contribute to the 'discus
sion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas'" that the First Amend
ment is designed to protect, and thus, are entitled to First Amendment protection
(quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978))).
319. See id.
320. See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 981 F. Supp. 996, 1003 n.4 (N.D. Tex.
1997) (quoting United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965) (alteration in origi
nal», rev'd, 154 F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 1998).
321. See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,468-72 (1977).
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First, the statutory language of the Act targets the BOCs by naming
them generally.322 The relevant sections are entitled: "Special Pro
visions Concerning Bell Operating Companies. "323 The Act also
targets the BOCs with specificity by naming each company individ
ually.324 Such specificity is virtually unprecedented. 325
Still, the specific naming of an individual or entity by an act
alone does not necessarily satisfy the specificity requirement. 326 In
Nixon, the Court provided that the Bill of Attainder Clause "was
not intended to serve as a variant of the equal protection doctrine,
invalidating every Act ... that legislatively burdens some persons
or groups but not all other plausible individuals."327 As such, a leg
islative act could single out an individual if the "focus of the enact
ment can be fairly and rationally understood" as requiring such
specificity.328
In Nixon, the nature of the act demonstrated that only former
President Nixon possessed materials that were the focus of the leg
islation. 329 However, in the case of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, numerous other corporations also pose a risk of anticompeti
tive behaviors yet are not included in the terms of the Act's Special
322. See 47 u.s.c. §§ 271-276 (Supp. III 1997).
323. Id.
324. See id. § 153. This section provides that:
The term 'Bell operating company' (A) means any of the following companies:
Bell Telephone Company of Nevada, Illinois Bell Telephone Company, Indi
ana Bell Telephone Company, Incorporated, Michigan Bell Telephone Com
pany, New England Telephone and Telegraph Company, New Jersey Bell
Telephone Company, New York Telephone Company, US West Communica
tions Company, South Central Bell Telephone Company, Southern Bell Tele
phone and Telegraph Company, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, The
Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania, The Chesapeake and Potomac Tel
ephone Company, The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of
Maryland, The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of Virginia,
The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of West Virginia, The Dia
mond State Telephone Company, The Ohio Bell Telephone Company, The
Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company ....
Id. § 153(4).
325. See BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Sentelle, J.,
dissenting).
326. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 471-72. See generally Comment, The Bounds of Leg
islative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALE
L.J. 330, 349-54 (1962) (arguing that when empirical evidence is necessary to decide
whether a broad rule applies to specific persons, then such a decision cannot be man
dated through legislation; however, when the judgment is definitional, more specific
legislation is permissible).
327. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 471 (footnote omitted).
328. Id. at 472.
329. See id. See supra Part I.C.1 for a discussion of Nixon.

REGULATION OR UNCONSTITUTIONAL PUNISHMENT

2000]

311

Provisions section.330
Accordingly, given the likelihood that the Bill of Attainder
Clause is available to corporations and that the Act operates with
unprecedented specificity, the primary obstacle to the BOCs' claim
that the Telecommunications Act's Special Provisions section is .a
bill of attainder depends on the definition of punishment.

C.

The Three-Part Test for Punishment and Its Limitations

The Supreme Court has articulated a three-part punishment
analysis for bill of attainder purposes. 331 The first test asks whether
the legislation in question has been historically regarded as punish
ment. 332 The second test considers whether the legislation is "puni
tive."333 The third test examines whether the legislature intended
to punish a specified group or individual,334 However, in part be
cause the Bill of Attainder Clause has rarely been litigated, and in
part because the significance of each prong has riever been suffi
ciently articulated, the meaning of punishment in the bill of attain
.
der context remains unclear. I
1.

The Historical Test

For bill of attainder purposes, the Supreme Court has repeat
edly examined whether an alleged punishment is punishment in a
historical sense. 335 Legislative acts that impose death, banishment,
imprisonment, or bans on various lines of employment historically
have been prohibited by the Bill of Attainder Clause.336 The limita
tions on the BOCs entering long distance and communications
equipment markets basically exclude the BOCs from lines of busi
ness and therefore should be considered historically prohibited. 337
330. See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 981 F. Supp. 996, 1001 (N.D. Tex.
1997) (noting that there are hundreds of local exchange carriers and several sizeable
local companies that are wholly unaffiliated with the BOCs), rev'd, 154 F.3d 226 (5th
Cir.1998).
331. See supra Part I.C.2 for a discussion of the development and requirement of
each prong of the test.
332. See supra Part I.C.2.a for a discussion of the first test.
333. See supra Part I.C.2.b for a discussion of the second test.
334. See supra Part I.C.2.c for a discussion of the third test.
335. See, e.g., Selective Servo Sys. V. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group,
468 U.S. 841, 852 (1984); Nixon V. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 473
(1977).
336. See, e.g., Nixon, 433 U.S. at 474-75 (citing United States V. Brown, 381 U.S.
437 (1965); United States V. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); Cummings V. Missouri, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 277 (1867».
337. See SBC Communications, Inc. V. FCC, 154 F.3d 226, 251 (5th Cir. 1998)
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The historical test may be regarded as a preliminary bill of at
tainder inquiry. When satisfied, the test provides an immediate red
flag that an act of Congress is inflicting punishment. The test is
effective because it defines punishment in terms of the methods by
which the legislature, both here and in England, had traditionally
condemned individuals or groups for their past actions. Legislated
banishment, imprisonment, and bans from lines of employment
have traditionally constituted unconstitutional legislative
punishment.
However, this inquiry is not effective solely because the partic
ular type of punishment has been historically regarded as contrary
to the Bill of Attainder Clause. Rather, the test is effective because
it is a simplified means of determining if the underlying objective of
the bill of attainder prohibition, the separation of the legislative and
judicial branches of government, is compromised. This fundamen
tal separation of powers objective has been asserted from the time
of Hamilton and has persisted in the relevant Supreme Court deci
sions. 338 Given the significance of the separation of powers doc
trine, the historical inquiry should not be easily dismissed.
However, both the SBC Communications and Bel/South majorities
have disregarded the importance of the historical test. 339 The fram
ers would not have intended for the definition of punishment to be
interpreted so narrowly.340 The historical punishment test is an ef
fective means of ensuring that the legislature has not infringed upon
the judiciary's duties. 341
Still, the historical test is not determinative of punishment.
First, the historical test is under-inclusive. An act may constitute
punishment even though it has not been historically regarded as
such because a creative legislature can always draft legislation that
falls outside the category of traditional historical punishments, yet
(Smith, J., dissenting); BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Sen
telle, J., dissenting).
338. See SBC Communications, Inc., 154 F.3d at 245-46; see also THE FEDERAL.
1ST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 44 (James Madison). See, e.g., Brown, 381 U.S.
at 443-46.
339. See supra Parts III.A and III.C, respectively, for a discussion of how these
majorities have avoided the historical test.
340. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 442 (stating that "[w]hile history thus provides some
guidelines ... the proper scope of the Bill of Attainder Clause and its relevance to
contemporary problems, must ultimately be sought by attempting to discern the reasons
for its inclusion in the Constitution, and the evils it was designed to eliminate").
341. See id. at 442, 443-46 ("[T]he Bill of Attainder Clause was intended ... as ...
a general safeguard against legislative exercise of the judicial function or more simply
trial by legislature.").
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nonetheless punishes a specified individual or group.342 In the
words of Madison, the people of America "have seen with regret
and with indignation, that sudden changes and legislative interfer
ences in cases affecting personal rights, become jobs in the hands of
enterprizing [sic] and influential speculators; and snares to the more
industrious and less informed part of the community."343 As a re
sult, the historical punishment test alone cannot address the risk of
legislative infringements on the judiciary.
Secondly, the historical test can only be one step of the punish
ment analysis since a restriction that is historically regarded as pun
ishment is not automatically violative of the Bill of Attainder
Clause. For example, in Hawker v. New York 344 and Dent v. West
Virginia,345 the Supreme Court held that qualification standards
that operate to exclude certain individuals from certain occupations
do not constitute legislative punishment when the qualifications are
reasonably related to the occupations. 346 To limit the risk of crea
tive punishment and avoid narrowing legislative regulatory powers,
the Court has defined the Bill of Attainder more broadly than just
the historical sense. 347
Years after Hawker and Dent, the Supreme Court developed a
test of punishment that might better identify when a legislative act
constitutes punishment: the functional test.348 For the Bill of At
tainder Clause to remain effective as an additional check to secure
the balance of powers between the legislature and the judiciary, the
"functional test" for punishment must also be considered.
2.

The Not-So-Functional Functional Test

Virtually every bill of attainder case that has come before the
Supreme Court has ultimately, if not explicitly, attempted to make
a distinction between permissible preventive regulation and uncon
342. See SBC Communications, Inc., 154 F.3d at 250 (Smith, J., dissenting).
343. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 227 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
344. 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
345. 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
346. See supra Part I.C.2.bj for a discussion of Hawker and Dent.
347. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810) (stating that a bill of
attainder "affect[s] the life of an individual, or may confiscate his property, or may do
both"); see also United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,447 (1965) (stating that the Bill of
Attainder Clause should be "read in light of the evil the Framers had sought to bar").
348. See infra note 352 and accompanying text for a description of the functional
test.
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stitutional legislative punishment. 349 However, members of the
Court have disagreed as to the nature of the distinction. For exam
ple, Justice Frankfurter opined that punishment, for purposes of the
Bill of Attainder Clause, requires an act to be wholly retributive to
be unconstitutionaP50 The Brown Court, on the other hand, stated
that punishment could have additional purposes aside from retribu
tion, such as deterrence or rehabilitation, and still fall within the
scope of the Bill of Attainder Clause. 351
The functional test is an attempt to determine whether chal
lenged legislation can reasonably be said to further nonpunitive
purposes when viewed in terms of the type and severity of the bur
dens imposed. 352 Of the three tests for punishment, this test most
effectively addresses the issue at the core of a bill of attainder
claim-whether the legislative act is punitive. This test does not
attempt to ascertain whether Congress has a good reason to punish,
since the separation of powers doctrine clearly prohibits Congress
from legislating punishment. 353 Once it has been determined that
Congress has punished, the inquiry should end.
The majorities in SBC Communications and BellSouth sug
gested that legislative punishment is permissible so long as Con
gress legislates within the "prophylactic exception."354 According
to their reasoning, if Congress attempted to prevent a future harm
through the use of an employment ban, the ban would be allowed
regardless of its specificity. However, the prevention of future
harms does not provide an exception to the rule that specific legisla
tive punishment is unconstitutional. If cases like Hawker and Dent
represent an exception, then specific legislation that punishes would
be permissible so long as it is also preventive. This result poses two
problems.
First, the majorities' conclusions undermine the separation of
349. See, e.g., Brown, 381 U.S. at 458-60; United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303,
324 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
350. See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 324.
351. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 458-60.
352. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 475-76 (1977); see
also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963); Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 96-97 (1958); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189,193-94 (1898); Dent v. West
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 128 (1889); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 319-20
(1867).
353. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 447. See supra Part LB for a discussion of the sepa
ration of powers doctrine.
354. See supra Part lILA and IILC, respectively, for a discussion of the courts'
application of the "prophylactic exception."
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powers doctrine because the legislature, instead of the courts,
would be making a determination of guilt and imposing punish
ment. 355 Secondly, in United States v. Brown,356 the Court held that
the assertion of a legitimate governmental interest alone does not
remove an act from the reach of the Bill of Attainder Clause. 357
Because punishment often has the dual function of retribution and
prevention, preventive aspects of a legislative act cannot save it
from bill of attainder status. 358 The Court stressed the significance
of the specificity of an act, regardless of whether it purports to pre
vent future harms, because Congress could otherwise avoid the Bill
of Attainder Clause by simply asserting a preventive goal.359 The
legislature can always hypothecate an acceptable basis for legisla
tion. Indeed, SBC Communications is a prime example of where
"the punishment comes cloaked in the mantle of prophylactic eco
nomic regulation."36o
Congress cannot single out an individual or group when it cre
ates a standard of conduct to meet preventive goals if the legislation
operates to punish that individual or groUp.361 Still, Congress may
achieve preventive goals if in enacting legislation it relies upon the
"general knowledge of human psychology" and reaches all men. 362
Therefore, the mere prevention of future harms is not an exception
to otherwise unconstitutional legislative punishment. The goal of
preventing future harms has only been an acceptable explanation
for an alleged bill of attainder when an act operates with a generally
applicable definition.363 This can only be done by Congress when
the rule applied is a "rule of universal application."364
Rather than establishing an exception to the Bill of Attainder
355. See supra Part I.B for a discussion of the separation of powers doctrine in
the context of the Bill of Attainder Clause. See also Brown, 381 U.S. 437 at 442-46.
356. 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
357. See id. at 458-61.
358. See id.
359. See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226, 250 (5th. Cir. 1998)
(Smith, J., dissenting).
360. Id. at 253 (Smith, J., dissenting).
361. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 447.
362. Id. at 454.
363. See Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 88 (1961) (determining that the language of the act described "a class of
activity" and not the Communist Party itself or its members); Hawker v. New York, 170
U.S. 189, 197 (1898) (finding that the description of "ex-felons" was permissible be
cause it was in the legislature's power "to prescribe a rule of general application based
upon a state of things which is ordinarily evidence of the ultimate fact sought to be
established").
364. Hawker, 170 U.S. at 197.
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Clause, Hawker and Dent exemplify the Court's first attempts to
distinguish between legislation that punishes and permissible pre
ventive regulation. In those cases, the Court concluded that absent
other evidence, reasonable qualification standards do not constitute
punishment and thus are not unconstitutionaP65
3. The Legislative Purpose
The third test for punishment is the legislative intent test. 366
This test correctly assumes that a legislatively created restriction or
requirement is more likely to constitute punishment if the legisla
ture's purpose was to punish. However, the effectiveness of the
third test for determining whether a statute punishes is questiona
ble. 367 An analysis of congressional motive in the case of the BOCs
is a good example of why the effectiveness is questionable. The
legislative history of the Act does not include remarks indicating
that the Special Provisions section was established to punish the
BOCs, but rather, indicates that the legislature acted with a
nonpunitive goaP68 The days of obvious improper legislative in
tent, such as in Lovett,369 may be long gone. To the extent that the
American public is allowed an inside view of its legislatures and is
kept abreast of the passage of new laws, it is unlikely that we would
see the kind of remarks today that the majority requires in order to
find a bill of attainder. Theoretically, Congress could mask the pu
nitive nature of an act by avoiding negative remarks and articulat
ing popular preventive goals. Consequently, a determination of
legislative intent should not be based solely on the absence of con
gressional remarks. If legislative intent is to be inquired into,
weight should also be given to the circumstances surrounding the
enactment of a law, such as its timing and effect. 370
D.

A Proposed Test for Punishment Under the Bill of Attainder
Clause
Neither the historical test nor the legislative purpose test by

365. See supra Part I.C.2.b.i for a discussion of Hawker and Dent.
366. See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 478 (1977).
367. See, e.g., Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, Inc., 975 F.2d 886, 890 (D.C. Cir.
1992) ("At its best, legislative history is an undependable guide to the meaning of a
statute. ").
368. See supra Parts III.A and III.C for a discussion of how the SBC Communica
tions and BellSouth courts interpreted the legislative history of the act.
369. See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lovett.
370. See BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58, 73 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Sentelle, J.,
dissenting).
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itself is sufficient to evaluate whether a legislative act constitutes a
bill of attainder. 371 Moreover, the functional test for punishment
has proven inadequate. 372 Each test attempts to ascertain whether
an act constitutes "punishment" when in fact that term has re
mained elusive. 373
Because the legislature's intent may not be clear, and because
historical punishments may be deemed necessary to prevent future
harms, it is necessary to define punishment in terms of the primary
aim of an act. If the primary aim of an act is its asserted preventive
purpose, it does not constitute punishment in the bill of attainder
context. 374 Consequently, factors taken into account under the
usual three-part punishment test remain relevant to determine the
primary aim of an act. These factors may include whether an act
historically constitutes punishment and whether evidence of the leg
islature's punitive intent exists.
However, the most significant factor to gauge when an act has
both punitive and preventive aspects is the specificity of the act. 375
When an individual or group is adversely affected by an act, but
does not constitute a "legitimate class of one," a court should deter
mine whether the terms of the act are sufficiently general so as to
create an objective standard that does not condemn a particular
group based on past acts.376
In the BOCs' case, the fact that Congress specifically targeted
the BOCs by name is indicative of the punitive nature of the Act. 377
Unless an individual or entity constitutes a legitimate class of one,
as in the case of former President Nixon, there can be no legitimate
reason for singling it out,378 Therefore, any proposed reason to tar
371. See supra Parts IV.C.l and IV.C.3 for a discussion of the historical and legis
lative purpose tests.
372. See supra Part IV.C.2 for a discussion of the functional test.
373. See Carol S. Steiker, Foreword: The Limits of the Preventive State, 88 J ..
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 771 (1998), for a criticism of the Supreme Court for failing to
make a clear distinction between prevention and punishment under the Ex Post Facto
and Double Jeopardy Clauses.
374. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 614 (1960).
375. See Note, supra 60, arguing for a finding of bill of attainder based on speci
ficity alone.
376. See supra Part I.C.1 for a discussion of the specificity requirement in light of
Nixon. See also infra note 378 for a comment on Nixon.
377. See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226, 251 (5th Cir. 1998)
(Smith, J., dissenting); BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 53, 73 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Sen
telle, J., dissenting). See supra Part IV.B for a discussion of the specificity of the Tele
communications Act.
378. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 472 (1977). More
over, laws are already in place that prohibit anti-competitive practices. Specifically, the
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get an individual or defined group should also apply to others simi
larly situated. 379 In this case, Congress has asserted that there is a
legitimate concern for keeping communications markets competi
tive. 380 However, the BOCs are not the only local service provid
ers.381 If the free market goal truly underlies the Special
Provisions, Congress would have also intended it to apply to those
other providers. Because other providers were not included within
the scope of the Act, it can be inferred that the intent of Congress
must have gone beyond preventive measures. More likely, Con
gress considered the past conduct of the BOCs, determined that
their behavior was not properly restricted by the courts, and re
stricted the BOCs from the possibility of carrying on the behavior
again by prohibiting them from entering various markets.
Although the absence of a means of escape has sometimes
b~en considered a criterion for a punitive act,382 the lack of a means
of escape is not determinative of punishment. 383 Nevertheless, it is
one indicator of how specifically an act operates. If one cannot
evade the operation of a legislatively enacted employment bar, then
it is more likely to be specific. On the other hand, if an escape
route does exist, it may be evidence that the statute is not legislat
ing with regard to a specific group or individual, but is instead fo
cusing on a general characteristic. 384 In this case, however, the Act
does not focus on one general characteristic, but rather, it clearly
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.c. § 2 (1994), provides that monopolizing or conspiring
to monopolize any part of trade or commerce between the states is a felony punishable
by a fine not exceeding $10 million if committed by a corporation. See also United
States v. AT&T, 461 F. Supp. 1314, 1321-22 (D.D.C. 1978) (finding AT&T subject to the
Sherman Antitrust Act notwithstanding the fact that the telecommunications industry is
a regulated industry (quoting Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 456
(1945))).
379. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 449 n.23, 450 (1965).
380. See supra Parts III.A and III.C for a discussion of the lower courts' treat
ment of congressional intent.
381. See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 981 F. Supp. 996, 1001 (N.D. Tex.
1997) (noting that there are hundreds of local exchange carriers and several sizeable
local companies that are wholly unaffiliated with the BOCs), rev'd, 154 F.3d 226 (5th
Cir.1998).
382. See supra Part I.C.2.b.ii for a discussion of non-punitive legislation.
383. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 456-57 & n.32. Even assuming that the presence of a
means of escape is significant independent of specificity, it is arguable that the BOCs do
not have a means of escape. Nothing can change the fact that the BOCs are subject to
the Act. The only ways for them to enter the restricted lines of business are to comply
with its terms or wait it out. In either case, a potential financial gain is forfeited. See
SBC Communications, Inc., 154 F.3d at 243 n.27. It is in the BOCs' best "economic and
business interest" to meet the criteria. Id.
384. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 454-55.
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specifies the BOCs by name. 385
The majority in SBC Communications determined that the
Special Provisions section does not constitute a prohibited bar
against employment because the restrictions are only for a limited
time and compliance is possible. 386 However, a requirement of a
"perpetual bar" is not the current state of the law. 387 In United
States v. Brown,388 the Supreme Court rejected the notion that ines
capability is a prerequisite for the Bill of Attainder Clause. 389 Had
Congress acted to imprison an individual for five years, there would
be no question that the action would be a bill of attainder even
though the restriction has a definite end. Similarly, if an individual
was allowed to perform community service to avoid the sentence, it
would still be legislative punishment. Indeed, "[the Constitution]
intended that the rights of the citizen should be secure against dep
rivation for past conduct by legislative enactment, under any form,
however disguised. If the inhibition can be evaded by the form of
the enactment, its insertion in the fundamental law was a vain and
futile proceeding."390 Consequently, the BOCs should not be de
nied the protection of the Bill of Attainder Clause simply because
Congress has left the BOCs with an escape, albeit an "onerous"
one. 391
The second significant factor to consider when determining the
primary aim of a legislative act addresses the requirement that a bill
of attainder must be punishment without the benefit of a judicial
trial. 392 As explained above, a case where legislative proceedings
parallel adjudicative judicial proceedings would be rare today.393
Still, a court can and should consider the extent to which a past
act or political affiliation can be associated with an individual or
group targeted by questionable legislation. 394 When such a rela
tionship is present, it can be inferred that Congress constructed the
385. See supra Part IV.B for a discussion of the specificity requirement.
386. See SBC Communications, Inc., 154 F.3d at 242-43.
387. See iii. at 248-49 (Smith J., dissenting).
388. 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
389. See iii. at 457 n.32. See also supra note 155 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Brown.
390. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277,325 (1867).
391. See SBC Communications, Inc., 154 F.3d at 243 n.27. See supra note 383 for
the proposition that the BOCs do not have a means of escape.
392. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977).
393. See supra Part IV.C.3 for an analysis of congressional motive in theory and
application.
394. See supra note 268 and accompanying text for a discussion of legislation that
singled out individuals or groups based on their political beliefs.
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legislation with either a real or perceived reason to punish the per
son or group. The closer the relationship, and thus the stronger the
inference, the more likely it is that Congress instituted punishment
by legislative action. In the BOCs' case, there is no political affilia
tion to consider; however, the relationship of the BOCs to AT&T
and the federal government's unsuccessful antitrust suits create an
inference of punishment.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Special Provisions section of the Telecom
munications Act of 1996 should be considered unconstitutional.
First, the target of the Special Provisions has been singled out
through the use of specific, not general terms, as evidenced by the
language of the Act. Second, the weight of factors consistent with
Supreme Court precedent suggests that the Special Provisions con
stitute punishment because the primary aim of that section is not to
create an objective standard meant to achieve preventive goals.
Rather, the specificity of the Special Provisions section and the cir
cumstances surrounding its enactment support the conclusion that
Congress's primary aim was to designate a group of corporations
for punishment for alleged antitrust violations that were never ade
quately resolved judicially.
Karey P. Pond

